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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States is in the midst of a medical malpractice
"crisis." Claims asserted against physicians, hospitals, and other
providers of health care have mushroomed dramatically in number'
and magnitude? Liability insurance premiums and the charges for
medical services that defray them3 also have soared predictably.4
1. Current estimates are that more than 20,000 medical malpractice claims are asserted
against doctors annually. NEWSWEEK, June 9, 1975, at 59. The number filed against physicians
in New York alone rose from 564 in 1970 to 1200 four years later. Id.
2. In New York, for example, the average size of a medical malpractice recovery
(whether judgment or settlement), grew from $6000 to $23,400 in the last decade. NEWSWEEK,
supra note 1, at 59. Twenty years ago a $100,000 verdict in a medical malpractice action was
practically unheard of. Stetler, The Historyof Reported MedicalProfessionalLiability Cases,
30 TEMPLE L.Q. 366, 381 (1957). This is in marked contrast to today's figures. California alone
reports 19 settlements or awards in excess of $1 million, 13 of which have come during the
last 28 months. NEWSWEEK, supra note 1, at 59. See, e.g., Niles v. City of San Rafael, 42 Cal.
App. 3d 230, 116 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1974) (a total of $4,025,000 was awarded to compensate for
quadriplegic injuries to an 11 year old boy); Weaver v. Tucson Medical Center, No. 133796
(Ariz. Super. Ct., Dec. 31, 1973) (settlement of approximately $2,000,000 in malpractice case
in which 14-year old patient reportedly suffered quadrispasticity and blindness), noted in 17
AM. TRIAL LAW. Ass'N NEWSLETrER 103 (1974).
3. See Altman, MalpracticeRates Drive Up Doctor Fees, N.Y. Times, July 27, 1975,
at 1, col. 4. One hospital has had to increase its room rates by $12 a day in order to cover
liability and malpractice premium rate increases. Id. at 24, cols. 2-3. Dr. Malcolm Todd,
president of the American Medical Ass'n, estimates that some patients who paid an
additional 100 a day in hospital charges to cover the cost of the liability insurance premiums
in 1965 will now pay an extra $3.65 per day for that purpose. Nat'l Observer, Feb. 15, 1975,
at 10. Others estimate that the increase in malpractice rates could add $2 or more to each
office visit to a physician and $4 a day to hospital bills. TIME, June 16, 1975, at 50.
The continuing ability of the medical profession to pass on all of the added costs of
malpractice insurance to the consumer is also debatable. Consider, for example, that the
annual income for anesthesiologists in the San Franscisco area reportedly averages $40,000
to $45,000, and that proposed increases in insurance rates would demand an annual premium
from the members of that specialty of $18,184. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 26, 1975, at
34. One wonders whether the health care market is sufficiently inelastic to tolerate the
marked increases in charges over such a short period of time that would be necessary to offset
the proposed rate changes.
4. Medical malpractice insurance rates have increased roughly 600% in the past three
or four years. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., supra note 3, at 33. Current estimates are that the
cost of such insurance runs about $1billion a year (350 million paid by doctors and 650 million
by hospitals) and could double in the next year. Id. One California hospital's insurance
premium increased from $14,000 in 1965 to $820,000 in 1975. Nat'l Observer, supra note 3, at
10. Premiums for orthopedic surgeons in New York have been projected as high as $40,000.
Welch, Medical Malpractice,292 N. ENG. J. MED. 1372, 1374 (1975).
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The imminent or threatened departure of a number of insurance
carriers from the business of providing professional liability protection5 in some states has further aggravated matters. As a result of
these developments an epic and regrettably destructive encounter
between two great professions, medicine and law, seems to be unfolding. One must ponder the curious etiology of the circumstance
that pits one profession against the other; that at once, threatens
the repose and integrity of one profession with the menace of criminalizing litigation while tying the economic sustenance of an appreciable segment of the other to the continued survival of those same
legal processes; that indulges the untenable premise that the most
highly schooled of our learned professions is also the most tortiously
culpable; that condones a numerical growth of one profession out of
proportion to societal demand and an unresponsiveness by the
other to the calls for more doctors and health care professionals.'
5. See, e.g., Nat'l Observer, supra note 3, at 10; NEWSWEEK, supra note 1, at 63; TIME,
supra note 3, at 49; TIME, May 5, 1975, at 82; TIME, March 24, 1975, at 62. In some instances
the threatened loss of insurance has provoked physician-initiated antitrust litigation. Now
Doctors Charge Insurers With Malpractice,Bus. WEEK, Aug. 4, 1975, at 40.
6. The current swell in the number of law graduates moving into the legal profession
has been ominously noted in a recent study:
Despite exhortation that rewarding careers should be open to all law graduates, there
seems little prospect that there will be a sizeable increase in demand in the near future
to meet the rising supply. . . Hence up to half of the graduates in the near future may
have to seek employment in fields where traditionally legal training is not a prerequisite.
York & Hale, Too Many Lawyers? The Legal Services Industry: Its Structure and Outlook,
26 J. LEGAL ED. 1, 30-31 (1973). A correlation between increases in the number of attorneys
and the number of malpractice claims would be sheer speculation. It is interesting to note,
however, that California, which is commonly regarded as the leader in medical malpractice
claims, now has no fewer than 56 operating law schools. 28 L. SCHOOL NEWS, May 1975, at 3.
7. The shortage of physicians has been identified as an important factor in the rise in
malpractice claims. SENATE SUBCOMM. ON EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE:
THE PATIENT VERSUS THE PHYSICIAN, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 4-5, 449-51 (Comm. Print 1969)
[hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. The Report of the Carnegie Commission on Higher
Education has recognized acute manpower shortages in health services and has called for a
significant increase in the number of medical personnel. CARNEGIE COMM'N ON HIGHER EDUCATION, HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE NATION'S HEALTH

13-22,44-45 (1970). Recent reports indicate

that there has been at least some improvement in this regard, although problems remain
acute in terms of geographic maldistribution of manpower and overconcentration in some
specialities and secondary care activities. Stimmel, The Congress and Health Manpower: A
Legislative Morass, 293 N. ENG. J. MED., 68, 72 (1975).
Health care professionals, especially physicians, have, with the help of state licensing
laws, reportedly established a virtual monoply over access to their professions. Thorne,

Professional Education in Medicine, in EDUCATION FOR THE PROFESSIONS OF MEDICINE, LAW,
THEOLOGY, AND SOCIAL WELFARE 25 (1975). By setting exclusive standards for admission, the
medical profession has regulated the number and type of people allowed to join its ranks
sometimes in order to suit the economic advantage of physicians. Id. Until such time as a
free market is more responsive to supply and demand, quality control will continue to be
enforced, however imperfectly, by governmental intervention through malpractice litigation
and direct quality control measures.
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The members of the professions, however, are not the only protagonists in this conflict. The injured patient, if the size of the claim
is sufficient to galvanize economy minded counsel,8 will assuredly
face inordinate delays and indefinite prospects of recovery, both
compounded by mercurial rules of law. Perhaps most aggrieved are
the members of society who must finance through higher medical
expenses this cost shifting apparatus. According to recent estimates,
less than one-third of each dollar paid in insurance premiums accrues to the benefit of injured patients.9 The rest is siphoned off by
plaintiff and defense counsel and insurance administrators. The
practice of defensive medicine,"0 an insidious outgrowth of the per8. It has been observed that it is not economically feasible to sue for medical malpractice where the total recovery will be less than $25,000. See Lieberman, Examining the Cases
for UniversalNo Fault,Bus. WEEK, April 28, 1975, at 56. Some have suggested a more flexible
approach of evaluating the total case, including both damages and liability potential, before
deciding whether to undertake representation. See L. CHARFOOS, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
CASE: A COMPLETE HANDBOOK 24-28 (1974).
In addition to the often enormous costs (for expert witnesses, discovery, protracted trials,
and third party practice), some attorneys are reportedly also influenced by a commendable
desire to avoid mere nuisance suits. Id. at 26. Arguably, since malpractice actions serve an
admonitory function, they should be pursued however small their damage potential. This
argument, however, runs afoul of the economic realities of litigation under a contingent fee
arrangement. Moreover, the fact that the action does not proceed upon a contingent fee basis
does not necessarily mean that the defendant is exculpated or that the plaintiff will be left
remediless. Presumably the patient could retain counsel on a straight hourly basis. Also,
direct disciplinary proceedings might be instituted in appropriate cases. As a general matter,
one also wonders whether the ordeal of a criminalizing malpractice action, absent the need
to redress a significant loss, is not normally more draconian than the allegedly negligent
conduct warrants.
9. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 10, estimating that between 30% and 38% of
the claims loss (the money paid out by the insurance company) goes to the patient. Since a
portion of the premium dollar also goes for the nonlitigation costs of the insurance company,
the actual amount paid to plaintiff out of the total premium dollaris even smaller. See, e.g.,
STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, AN OVERVIEW OF MEDICAL

94th Cong., 1st Sess., 5, 8 (Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as OVERVIEW]
(noting varying estimates that from 16% to 38% of the premium dollar reaches the patient);
Bachman, Doctors: Move Closer to Your Patient,11 TRIAL, May-June, 1975, at 25 (estimating
that 18% of the premium dollar goes for patient benefits); Morris, Medical Report: Malpractice Crisis-A View of Malpracticein the 1970's, 38 INS. COUNSEL J. 521, 523 (1971) (summarizing a study putting patient recovery at 16% to 27% of the premium dollar).
10. Defensive medicine is essentially the management of a patient's care not only with
an eye for the patient's welfare, but also in an effort preemptively to fashion an unassailable
record in anticipation of potential malpractice litigation. In response to the threat of liability
based on possibly specious allegations of negligence, a physician has asked perceptively,
perhaps rhetorically, how practitioners can avoid the temptation of "treating the chart" along
with the patient. Gorney, A Doctor's Plea for Intelligent Compromise, 7 TRIAL, May-June
1971, at 53. To the extent that the practice of defensive medicine diverts energy, attention,
and resources from the immediate care of the patient to the chimera of litigation, the likelihood of an avoidable mistake and the misapplication of unnecessary, expensive, and even
dangerous procedures are increased. Similarly, a fear of being sued no doubt discourages some
physicians from undertaking particularly high risk procedures or from developing innovative
MALPRACTICE,
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vasive threat of liability, has further increased the costs of health
care. Perhaps most perverse, the costs of the malpractice system
currently are not shared uniformly throughout society, but often are
disproportionately borne by those who are inadequately covered by
government health care programs or private health insurance and
who, by reason of their infirmity, are least able to bear such inflated
costs.
In light of increasing numbers of lawsuits and higher medical
costs, it is not surprising that an unprecedented public expatiation
on the causes" and cures for the malpractice crisis has flourished.
The perceived need shared by some to overhaul the present system
has sent reverberations running through the state and federal legislatures'" and the medico-legal community. Unfortunately, in their
apparent zeal, spokesmen for the various constituencies often have
seemed to thrust past each other rather than to target their contentions in meaningful dialogue. The time may be ripe to retrench and
survey the scene, not only with an eye toward possible change, but
also to guard against what might prove an improvident rush to
judgment.
As the conflict becomes clearer two fundamental questions will
likely predominate. First, should a theory of strict liability or notechniques. See generally Bernzweig, Defensive Medicine, in HEW,

REPORT OF THE

SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, Appendix at 38-40 (1973) [hereinafter

cited as HEW REPORT]. Current estimates are that defensive medical practices cost between
2 and 7 billion dollars annually. Regier, The View From HEW on FederalInvolvement in the
MalpracticeSituation, 3 J. LEGAL MED., June, 1975, at 19 (derived from speech by Dr. Roger
0. Egeberg, Special Assistant to Secretary HEW for Health Policy). Others have suggested
that the practice of defensive medicine is not so extensive, nor is it a significant contributing
factor to the high costs of medical care. The Medical MalpracticeThreat: A Study of Defensive Medicine, 1971 DUKE L.J. 939, 964-65. This difference of opinion probably in part reflects
inherent difficulties in identifying and measuring defensive medical practices. See Hershey,
The Defensive Practiceof Medicine, 50 MILBANK MEM. FUND Q. 69 (1972).
11. Although the focus of this article will be upon legal aspects of medical malpractice,
there are diverse nonlegal factors that have contributed to the increase in malpractice claims.
They at least deserve mention. Foremost among them are: (1) the breakdown of physicianpatient rapport; (2) the impersonalization of health care; (3) quantitative increases in the
demand for and delivery of health care; (4) a negative public image of medical professionals;
(5) an insufficient supply of medical personnel and resources; (6) the emerging consumerism
among patients; (7) the growing litigiousness of society, fanned by contingent fee-minded
attorneys; (8)an increased public understanding of medical facts; and (9) unrealistic public
expectations regarding medical treatment. For a discussion of some of the foregoing items,
see SENATE REPORT, supra note 7 at 2-5, 447-51. Dr. Kflbler-Ross also tells of a growing public
reluctance to -accept the inevitability of death and pain. E. KOBLER-Ross, ON DEATH AND
DYING 6, 14-15 (1969). This may have also played a significant role in the quickening of the
malpractice crisis.
12. For a summary of some of the recently enacted or proposed state and federal legislation see OvERvIEw, supra note 9, at 36-193; Zimmerly & Smiley, Legislators React to the
Medical Malpractice Problem, 3 J. LEGAL MED., May 1975, at 30-34.
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fault displace the present system of fault based medical malpractice
liability? Secondly, if fault is retained as an integral determinant
in loss allocation for medical accidents, should a professionally defined standard of care provide the legal standard against which
conduct normally should be evaluated?
On the first issue, it would seem that the adoption of a no-fault
solution for all medical misadventures would be a mixed blessing,
difficult to justify. The costs, even with a ceiling on recoveries,
would be awesome. Definitional problems in identifying compensable events might largely nullify potential administrative savings.
Serious egalitarian questions would also be raised. Should medical
accidents be treated differently from insults from other causes?
Would no-fault recoveries for economic losses not perpetuate social
economic inequities at taxpayer or patient expense?' 3 Rather than
a no-fault system, a social security type plan for reimbursement of
medical expenses for all misfortunes, whatever their causes, seems
a more credible prospect. If neither the collateral source rule" nor a
right of subrogation 5 were applicable to such a plan, there would
remain economic and perhaps other non-medical losses to be handled, if at all, under the fault system. As to the second issue, the
appropriate standard of care when the fault system is retained, it is
felt that deference to the collective judgment of the medical profession rather than to the ad hoc intuitions of lay jurists or triers of fact
is the sounder course.
In the sections that follow, these issues will be examined in
greater detail. First, the current fault system will be examined, and
the prospects for its continued application will be discussed along
with no-fault and social security type alternatives. Next, the concept of the professionally developed standard of care and the customary practice standard will be explained. The author's "accepted
practice" formulation will be defined and analyzed, and some advantages of a professionally developed standard will be discussed.
Finally, the relationship of the standard to the Professional Standards Review Organization of the Social Security Act will be examined.
II.

PROSPECTS FOR CONTINUATION OF THE FAULT SYSTEM FOR MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE

The popularity of the no-fault theory of loss allocation for auto13.
14.
15.

See text accompanying notes 39-87 infra.
See note 50 infra.
See note 51 infra.
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mobile accidents' 6 was inspired in large measure by onerous features
of the traditional negligence approach. Automobile accident victims
often were unevenly or arbitrarily treated, and the delay and other
shortcomings of the fault system exacted a heavy administrative
toll.' 7 Moreover, the validity of the deterrent effects of the threat of
civil liability has been questioned in the automobile accident setting.'8 The growing skepticism about the present system of loss allocation for medical malpractice has sparked interest in possible alternatives in this sphere as well. Most cases that have considered
the question have, absent an express contract to produce a specified
result, rejected an explicit adoption of strict liability for medical
accidents arising out of professional services. 9 Nevertheless, the
ascendency in malpractice litigation of such liability-producing concepts as informed consent,2 0 res ipsa loquitur,2 ' respondeat
16. States with approximately 53% of the nation's population have enacted some form
of no-fault automobile insurance. J. OF COMM., Jan. 27, 1975, § 2, at 6A, col. 4. See also
Gouldin, Countrywide Overview of Automobile No-Fault Insurance, 23 DEFENSE L.J. 443
(1974). For an excellent analysis and overview of the characteristics of such plans, see Blum
& Kalven, Ceilings, Costs, and Compulsion in Auto Compensation Legislation, 1973 UTAH
L. REV. 341.
17. See generally, P. KEETON & R. KEETON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS,

457 n.1, (and authorities cited therein), 457-539 (1971); REPORT OF
ON AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT REPARATONS, 94 A.B.A. REP. 559 (1969).

THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

18. See note 67 infra and accompanying text.
19. For a sampling of cases refusing to extend strict liability to professional medical
services, see e.g., Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 355 F. Supp. 1065, 1066-67 (E.D. Wis.
1973) (dictum without deciding); Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hosp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 98
Cal. Rptr. 187 (1971) (strict liability held not applicable to hospital as user of allegedly
defective needle); Viland v. Winslow, 34 Mich. App. 486, 191 N.W.2d 735 (1971) (physician
not liable solely because of an alleged poor result of the treatment absent proof of substandard
care); Magner v. Beth Israel Hosp., 120 N.J. Super. 529, 535, 295 A.2d 363, 366 (1972) (strict
liability not applicable to medical and dental professions); Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342
(Tex. 1968) (strict liability not applicable to optometrist's professional acts). See generally
Rubin, Manufacturerand Professional User's Liabilityfor Defective Medical Equipment, 8
AKRoN L. REV. 99, 103-05 (1974). The contaminated blood situation (in which there have been
some strict liability decisions for the patient, usually involving transmission of hepatitis) has
now largely been disposed of in almost all jurisdictions either by decisions or legislation
favoring hospitals and blood banks. D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN ANUTSHELL
132 (1974).
20. See text accompanying notes 199-221 infra.
21. See, e.g., Clark v. Gibbons, 66 Cal. 2d 399, 416, 426 P.2d 525, 537, 58 Cal. Rptr.
125, 137 (1967) (Tobriner, J., concurring., arguing in favor of strict liability in certain unexplained surgical accidents, commenting tat if public policy demands liability without fault,
responsibility should be fixed openly and uniformly and not under the guise of res ipsa
loquitur). See generally Binder, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Medical Malpractice,17 CLEV. MAR. L.
REV. 218 (1968); Morris, Res Ipsa Loquitur - Liability Without Fault, 163 J.A.M.A. 1055
(1957); Rubsamen, Res Ipsa Loquitur in CaliforniaMedical MalpracticeLaw - Expansion
of a Doctrine to the Bursting Point, 14 STAN. L. REV. 251 (1962); Seavey, Res Ipsa Loquitur:
Tabula in Naufragio, 63 HARV. L. REv. 643 (1950); Thode, The Unconscious Patient: Who
Should Bear the Risk of Unexplained Injuries to a Healthy Partof His Body?, 1969 UTAH L.
REV. 1.
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22 physician guarantees or warranties "to cure," 23 and more
superior,
recently, direct challenges to the professionally determined standard of care,24 attests to the pressures on the courts to shift losses
notwithstanding the absence of usual evidence of fault.2 5 This tendency is undoubtedly symptomatic of an inherent perturbation that
has always distressed fault based tort law. One writer has aptly
characterized the problem as the "mutual hampering effect"26 of
attempting at once to compensate and to punish with a single
money judgment. By forcing an accommodation between compensatory and admonitory objectives, this phenomenon unquestionably
has distorted both goals. Despite this dissonance in fault based
liability generally and the obvious plague that has beset the law of
medical malpractice in particular, however, the wholesale repudiation of liability based upon fault for medical malpractice does not
appear proximate or, for that matter, justified.
Commentators, while generally bemoaning the shortcomings of
the fault based system, have differed in their recommendations for
changes in the law's response to medical accidents. A general nofault system for malpractice,2 7 issuance of first party health and
accident insurance to patients,2" strict liability for at least certain
22. See generally Note, Separationof Responsibility in the OperatingRoom: The Borrowed Servant, the Captainof the Ship, and the Scope of the Surgeons' Vicarious Liability,
49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 933 (1974); Comment, Hospital Liability for the Negligence of Physicians: Some Needed Legal Sutures, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 844 (1974).
23. See, e.g., Tierney, ContractualAspects of Malpractice, 19 WAYNE L. REV. 1457
(1973); Note, Establishing the ContractualLiability of Physicians, 7 CALIF. (DAvIs) L. REV.
84 (1974); Note, Express Contracts to Cure: The Nature of ContractualMalpractice,50 IND.
L.J. 361 (1975); Comment, Reassurance or Contract: The Physician Caught Between the
Scylla and Charybdis, 41 U.M.K.C.L. REV. 118 (1972); 41 TENN. L. REV. 964 (1974).
24. See, e.g., Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 520, 519 P.2d 981, 984 (1974) (Utter,
J., concurring, urging in view of the court's rejection of the professional standard under the
facts of the case, that the decision should rest on strict liability grounds rather than negligence principles).
25. On the trend in the direction of strict liability in medical malpractice generally, see
Comment, Medical Malpractice: A Move Toward Strict Liability, 21 LOYOLA L. REV. 194
(1975).
26. Morris, Rough Justice and Some Utopian Ideas, 24 ILL. L. REV. 730, 733 (1930); see
A. EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT 84 (1951).
27. See Carlson, A Conceptualizationof a No-Fault CompensationSystem for Medical
MalpracticeInjuries, 7 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 329 (1973); Haines, The Medical Profession and
the Adversary Process, 11 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 41, 52-53 (1973); Comment, Continuing the
Common Law Response to the New IndustrialState: The Extension of Enterprise Liability
to Consumer Services, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 401, 427-30 (1974).
28. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, Compulsory "HospitalAccident" Insurance:A Needed First
Step Toward the Displacement of Liability for "Medical Malpractice," 31 U. CHI. L. REV.
279 (1964); Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis:An Analysis and a Proposal, 24 STAN. L.
REV. 439, 478-79 (1972) (recommends first party insurance coverage against transfusionassociated hepatitis); Morris, supra note 9, at 523 (advocating issuance of insurance against
a "therapeutic misadventure" for hospital patients).
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types of occurrences, 2 elective or limited no-fault systems, 3 some
form of social security type compensation, 3 ' as well as retention of
the present system, 32 all have been advocated.
29. See, e.g., Havighurst & Tancredi, "Medical Adversity Insurance" - A No-Fault
Approach to Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 1974 INS. L.J. 69 (proposing nofault for specific types of iatrogenic injuries); Note, Products and the Professional: Strict
Liability in the Sale-Service Hybrid Transaction, 24 HAST. L.J. 111 (1972) (urging strict
liability of professional users of defective product); Comment, Injuries PrecipitatedBy Psychotherapy: Liability Without Fault As a Basis for Recovery, 20 S.D.L. REV. 401 (1975)
(suggests no-fault for iatrogenic injuries arising from psychotherapy). One writer seems to
advocate the imposition of liability for medically induced injuries that are humanly avoidable
under the current state of the art and that could have been prevented without unacceptable
expense. Greenfield, Consumer Protectionin Service Transactions- Implied Warrantiesand
Strict Liability in Tort, 1974 UTAH L. REV. 661, 698-706. This inventive, though admittedly
"fuzzy," standard does not appear to have fully shed the notion of negligence or at least the
hint of arguably culpable conduct. As such, it would probably compound the definitional
problems anticipated in no-fault approaches generally and would be extremely difficult, if
not impossible, to administer.
30. See Note, ComparativeApproaches to Liability for Medical Maloccurrences, 84
YALE L.J. 1141, 1158-60 (1975). This commentator has, interalia, expressed an interest in an
elective no-fault approach as typified in S. 215, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), at least prototypically as a means of testing the feasibility of a no-fault approach. This bill would permit
election between fault and no-fault remedies after the injury.
An elective no-fault system involving election before an injury occurs has also been
proposed. O'Connell, Elective No-Fault Liability by Contract - With or Without an Enabling Statute, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 59, 65. For variations and ruminations on the elective nofault theme, see J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY (1975); O'Connell, No-FaultInsurance for Injuries Arising From Medical Treatment: A Proposal for Elective Coverage, 24
EMoRY L.J. 21 (1975); O'Connell, Elective No-FaultInsurancefor Many Kinds of Accidents:
A Proposaland An "Economic" Analysis, 42 TENN. L. REV. 145 (1974).
31. Professor Keeton, while expressing reservations about the relative advantages and
prospects for a no-fault system for medical injuries, seems to offer at least tacit support for a
limited social security-type plan (perhaps a national health insurance plan) that would reimburse medical expenses regardless of the cause of the underlying injury and not merely those
that were iatrogenically induced, i.e., injuries proximately induced or related to treatment.
Keeton, Compensation for Medical Accidents, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 590, 612-17 (1973); see
Silverstein, Compensating Those Injured Through Experimentation,48 CONN. B.J. 398, 40611 (1974) (recommends social security plan for injuries arising out of medical experimentation). Perhaps the most notably and far-reaching application of social security principles to
accident law has been the New Zealand experiment. Palmer, Compensation for Personal
Injury: A Requiem for the Common Law in New Zealand, 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1973); Palmer
& Lemons, Toward the Disappearanceof Tort Law - New Zealand's New Compensation
Plan, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 693.
32. See, e.g., Kretzmer, The Malpractice Suit: Is It Needed?, 11 OSGOODE HALL L.J.
55, 79 (1973) (recommending retention of the fault system for damages not recoverable under
a compensation scheme); Lanzone, A Defense Lawyer Views ProductsLiability and Professional LiabilityNo-Fault, 1975 INS. L.J. 82; Associationof TrialLawyers of America Position
Paper- A Positionof Responsibility, 11 TRIAL, May-June, 1975, at 49. In a recent comprehensive report on medical malpractice the Commission charged by the Secretary of HEW to
study the problem cautioned, in the context of no-fault, against leaping "headlong from a
system that works (with however many faults) into an untested one that may cause even more
severe problems." HEW REPORT, supra note 10, at 101. Some commentators, recognizing the
benefits of at least a limited social security health plan for injuries, have questioned the
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Despite current interest in no-fault alternatives, the complete
demise of the fault based system in medical malpractice does not,
for both practical and political reasons, appear imminent.33 A more
likely development probably will be the enactment of a national
health insurance plan3 1 whereby medical expenses will be reimbursed without regard to their cause. Remaining losses (consisting
primarily of economic loss and perhaps pain and suffering) would
be handled under the fault system. With some of the pressure to find
liability in order to compensate the victim removed by the prevalence of universal health insurance, the standard of care might also
be clarified and applied with greater predictability even if more of
the economic losses attributable to the health care enterprise were
externalized as a result, that is, borne directly by the patientconsumer. In a jurisprudential world that often strives single mindedly for ultimate solutions, the foregoing prospects undoubtedly will
fall short of the apocalyptic vision of some. Yet, those prospects are
not only reasonably foreseeable developments but ones that perhaps
represent the most sensible compromise at this time.
To facilitate discussion, defined here is the terminology that
will be used to refer to three basic system-types for loss redistribution-the fault, no-fault, and social security systems. 35 The fault
system is premised on the notion that a defendant has engaged in
conduct falling below socially acceptable standards and therefore
must redress the losses caused. Liability insurance held by the defendant is a common, though not universal, feature of this system.
A no-fault plan would provide compensation for certain losses, regardless of whether the causative agent was blameworthy, as long
as those losses arose out of a predefined transaction or activity, such
advantages to be gained in redressing the remaining, nonmedical losses (economic, pain and
suffering, etc.) under a no-fault as opposed to a fault system. Keeton, supra note 31, at 61516.
33. A sampling of a few of the recent state statutes spawned by the current "malpractice crises" seems to suggest, as nearly as one can tell, the continued vitality of the fault
system for medical malpractice. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 16-9.5-1-1 et seq. (Supp. 1975);
Tennessee Medical Malpractice Review Board and Claims Act of 1975, ch. 299, §§ 14(a)(1),
17(a), [1975] Tenn. Pub. Acts 662; Idaho Hospital-Medical Liability Act, S. 1186, 43d Leg.,
1st Sess. § 10 (1975).
34. For some thinking on the subject of national health insurance, see, e.g., E. KENNEDY,
IN CRITICAL CONDITION THE CRISIS IN AMERICA'S HEALTH CARE (1972); Hearings on H.R.
13870, 12684 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). The
diversity of the proposals suggested under the National Health Insurance rubric is well illustrated in Falk, National Health Insurance:A Review of Policies and Proposals,35 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 669, 678-90 (1970). The private health insurance system is vigorously criticized in Bodenheimer, Cummings, & Harding, Capitalizing on Illness: The Health Care
Industry, 4 INT'L J. HEALTH SERVICES 583 (1974).
35. The essential outlines of the three approaches are aptly described in Keeton, supra
note 31, at 600-01. See generally G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 3-16 (1970).
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as the providing of medical care. Depending on the context, liability insurance may take the form either of first-party coverage (issued in advance to the injured party) as in some no-fault automobile
insurance plans 31 or of liability insurance as found in many areas of
tort law now governed by strict liability. 7 In either case, costs would
be distributed through insurance premiums intramurally among the
insured contributors participating in or affected by the enterprise in
question. A social security system, as envisioned herein, would depart from the preceding models in at least two respects. First, a
social security system would compensate those individuals in the
class covered for specific losses without regard for either the identity
(cause) or quality (culpability or innocence) of the force that produced the injury. Thus, the system would address all injuries and
illnesses of individuals covered, rather than exclusively therapy related ones. Secondly, such a social security system would spread the
costs of health care over most members of the taxpaying public,
thereby accomplishing probably a broader loss distribution than
under either of the other systems.
The future trends in society's response to medical accidents will
be discussed in terms of three fundamental considerations: (1) the
administrative costs of implementing the desired loss allocation; (2)
the fundamental fairness of the allocation; and (3) the effects of the
loss allocation on the quality of health care. 8
A.

Administrative Costs

The administrative costs of the existing fault based system for
allocating losses for medical malpractice include four components-the cost of administering the insurance agreement, the
amount of plaintiff's recovery, and the fees for plaintiffs and defendant's counsel. In the absence of empirical data the relative administrative costs of the fault and no-fault options are difficult if not
impossible to quantify. It is possible, however, to speculate on the
general cost effect of each system.
Medical malpractice cases are extremely complex, time consuming, and costly to litigate because of the need for expert testimony and a personalizing of the lawsuit that discourages settlement. The relatively small portion of each malpractice insurance
36. See Blum & Kalven, supra note 16 at 344-45, 362-64.
37. For an overview of the turn toward strict liability in tort law generally, see Peck,
Negligence and Liability Without Fault in Tort Law, 46 WASH. L. REV. 225 (1971).
38. For a more particularized exposition of the characteristics of what are perceived as
good systems of compensation or accident law, see G. CALABRESI, supra note 33, at 24-33; 2
F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 11.5, 12.4 (1956); Keeton, supra note 31, at 603.
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premium dollar that reaches an aggrieved litigant bears witness to
this cost. 9 There is, therefore, a temptation to embrace a no-fault
solution that hopefully would simplify the litigation process and
thereby reduce administrative costs and ultimately malpractice insurance premiums. Even if the issue of personal fault were eliminated, however, the difficult causation question" with its concomitant costs would survive under no-fault.4' Unlike the situation involved in most personal injury lawsuits, in a medical accident a
patient generally enters the professional relationship at issue after
the onset of the original symptoms, which complicates the identification of the cause of the patient's ultimate condition. The causation issue might be especially abstruse under a no-fault system in
which some form of compensable event other than a negligent act
would be required as a causative antecedent. Presumably, a patient
would recover even absent negligence as long as the injuries were
iatrogenic (that is, proximately induced by or related to treatment).
Determining whether an injury is iatrogenic for compensation purposes, however, is a difficult and imprecise endeavor. One commentator has aptly characterized it as "[p]erhaps the most troublesome problem"4 2 that perplexes no-fault proposals. Courts might
lapse back into casuistic distinctions between commission and
omission and other equally counter-productive exercises. Sorting
out the causal dynamics of an inpatient's cardiac arrest,4 3 postsurgical infection, or other arguably therapy induced injuries promises to be an expensive, enervating process with little chance of
uniformity. Thus, the administrative savings likely to accrue from
a no-fault system by elimination ofthe fault question may be largely
offset by the added complexities in defining and proving causation.
It also is relevant to note that the administrative costs required
to prove fault under the present system eventually may be mitigated, along with a simplification and expedition of the trial itself,
39. See note 9 supra and accompanying text. To the extent that a no-fault plan would
be administered through private insurance, the percentage of the premium not returned in
benefits would probably remain high. Blum & Kalven, supranote 16, at 344 n.6. The administrative "take" under no-fault, however, would still probably be less than under the existing
fault-based system.

40. D.

HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

§§ 4.1-4.2 (1973).

41. Keeton, supra note 31, at 597.
42. Id. at 614.
43. The following hypothetical situation serves to illustrate the problem:
[Aissume a patient has a heart condition which is difficult to diagnose. Under a
no-fault system, would the patient be compensated if (a) he went to a hospital, suffered
a cardiac arrest, and died while being treated; or (b) he went to a hospital, was given a
complete physical, and then sent home where he died the same night; or (c)he never
went to a hospital, but suffered a cardiac arrest and died?
Waxman, Spiraling Costs: A Health Care Slide, 11 TRIAL, May-June 1975, at 28.
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by the use of screening panels and arbitration plans as alternate or
complementary forums within the fault system.44 Continued developments in this direction could render the present system less objectionable and remove some of the impetus from those advocating nofault as an economy measure.
Even if the definitional obstacles of no-fault could be surmounted,"5 the added expense of compensating the additional numbers of injured patients probably would be staggering. It has been
estimated that forty percent of the population has had a negative,
but not necessarily negligent, health-impairing experience with
health care. 46 The number of iatrogenic injuries sustained annually
during the course of hospital care has been put in the two and one
half to six million range.47 When added to those iatrogenic injuries
occurring outside of the hospital, the totals become even more inflated and certainly dwarf the estimated 18,000 to 20,000 medical
malpractice claims currently asserted each year.48 Some no-fault
proposals, by providing for the payment of attorneys' fees in some
44. See generallyAdams & Bell, Alternatives to LitigationII: Constitutionalityof ArbitrationStatutes, in HEW REPORT, supra note 10, App. at 314; Baird, Musterman & Stevens,
Alternatives to Litigation,I: TechnicalAnalysis,in HEW REPORT, supra note 10, App. at 214;
Gibbs, MalpracticeScreening Panels andArbitrationin Medical Liability Disputes, J. LEGAL
MED., May-June, 1973 at 30; Henderson, ContractualProblems in the Enforcement of Agreements to Arbitrate Medical Malpractice,58 VA. L. REV. 947 (1972); Wadlington, Alternatives
to Litigation,IV: The Arbitration Laws of the US. in HEW REPORT, supra note 10, App. at
346; Comment, The Medical Malpractice Mediation Panel in the FirstJudicialDepartment
of New York: An Alternative to Litigation, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 261 (1974); Note, The New
Mexico Medico-Legal Malpractice Panel-An Analysis, 3 NEW MEX. L. REv. 311 (1973);
Comment, The Medical Malpractice Crisis:Is the Medical Review Committee a Viable and
Legal Alternative?, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 405 (1975). A number of states have enacted or are
seriously considering screening panels or arbitration plans. Perhaps the most notable example
to date has been Indiana, which on April 17, 1975, enacted a bill establishing, among other
things, a medical review panel for malpractice claims. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 16-9.5-9-1 et
seq. (Supp. 1975).
45. The no-fault plan that has perhaps come closest to providing a workable answer to
the definitional problems for at least some types of medical accidents has been the selective
compensation plan of Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 29. These authors proposed the
development of a catalogue of compensable events with a high iatrogenticity correlation in
order to ease causation-proof requirements, regularize compensation, and strengthen qualitypromoting incentives. Id. at 75-76.
46. Wolfe, The Real Victim, 11 TRIAL, May-June 1975, at 30. For general observations
on the incidence of iatrogenic injuries, see R. MOSER, DISEASES OF MEDICAL PROGRESS (3d ed.
1969); Barr, Hazardsof Modem Diagnosisand Therapy - The Price We Pay, 159 J.A.M.A.
1452 (1955); Kampmeier, Diseases of Medical Progress, 59 So. MED. J. 871 (1966); Pocincki,
Dogger, & Schwartz, The Incidence of latrogenic Injuries, in HEW REPORT,' supra note 10,
App. at 50; Schimmel, The Hazards of Hospitalization,60 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 100
(1964).
47. Regier, supra note 10, at 22. See Bernzweig, Getting to the Root of the Problem, 11
TRIAL May-June, 1975, at 59 (estimating the total number of iatrogenic injuries sustained
during hospital care as in the 2 to 4 million range).
48. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. May 26, 1975, at 33.
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cases regardless of whether payment was even due under the nofault criteria,4 9 could conceivably raise the costs much more. Admittedly, the use of an arbitrarily set ceiling on benefits might reduce
the costs of a no-fault system. This would, however, afford incomplete compensation for many and would mean that the administrative costs would consume a greater proportion of the premium dollar. In any event, unless the ceiling reduced the level of compensation to a nominal sum, which would then certainly not justify the
administrative costs of shifting the loss, the total costs of a no-fault
system even with a ceiling probably would well exceed present costs.
A social security type national health plan appears to be a more
likely and more defensible development than a no-fault plan, at
least for present purposes. If neither the "collateral source" rule"
nor a right of subrogation5 ' were applicable to such a plan, the fault
system would then apply only to nonmedical losses such as economic loss and perhaps pain and suffering. Similarly, recovery in
the absence of fault would be limited exclusively to reimbursement
of medical expenses. Since all such losses, regardless of source,
would be remedied, proof of causation and related definitional problems that plague no-fault proposals would be avoided under a national health plan for innocently caused injuries. At the same time,
by limiting such a plan to the reimbursement of exclusively medical
expenses, the costs would be more tolerable than those under a nofault approach covering all damages. Additional administrative savings also may be anticipated since medical benefits, unlike no-fault
49. Kennedy-Inouye Bill, S. 215, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1726(d) (1975).
50. The collateral source rule holds essentially that "benefits received by the plaintiff
from a source collateral to the tortfeasor . . . may not be used to reduce the defendant's

liability for damages." D. DOBBS,

HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDmS

185 (1973). See generally

Fleming, The CollateralSource Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1478
(1966). Thus, if the collateral source rule applied to benefits under a national health insurance
plan, the plaintiff who could prove fault might recover for his medical expenses from the
defendant despite the fact that they were already reimbursable under the plan. This result
would seem difficult to justify, at least if there were no right of subrogation vested in the
agency providing the national health benefits, or there otherwise remained the probability of
a double recovery by claimant.
51. If a national health insurance plan contained provisions subrogating the insurer, to
the extent of its outlay for medical expenses, to any causes of action the patient may have
had for malpractice, some of the administrative abuses of the fault system would reassert
themselves. Perhaps such claims, which would essentially be among insurance carriers inter
se, could be handled through a voluntary arbitration approach. In the final analysis, however,
one may question whether there is sufficient justification for redistributing such losses
(considering especially the inherent imponderables of medical science) to warrant the administrative expenses necessary to recapture the medical expenses. Cf. Keeton, supra note 31, at
616-17. On the subject of subrogation clauses generally, see Capwell & Greenwald, Legal and
PracticalProblems Arising from Subrogation Clauses in Health and Accident Policies, 22
FED. INST. COUNSEL Q., Winter 1972, at 23.
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economic benefits, would be standardized, and the administrative
costs of individualization of economic losses52 would be restricted to
cases involving fault. In a consumer oriented public that increasingly regards good health as a matter of right,53 the political climate
also appears more conducive to a national health care plan than to
a straight no-fault solution.
B. Considerationsof Fairness
It is self-evident that the administrative costs of redistributing
losses attributable to medical malpractice are reflected in higher
medical charges.Y The liability insurance premium pays everyone
associated with the loss-redistribution process, and the funds for the
premium are derived from the charges for medical services. A significant portion of the medical services are financed by the government55 or through private health insurance," and these institutions
are capable of spreading administrative costs over a large portion
of the general population. Such universal risk spreading does not
occur when medical expenses are borne directly by the individual.57
In that situation, members of society who, by reason of their infirmity, often are least able to withstand the high costs of medical care
nevertheless are forced to pay not only the actual cost for these
services, but also those additional charges that go for liability insurance premiums. Under a no-fault plan the burden probably would
continue to fall most heavily upon those who, because of their medical condition, require more extensive health care. To be sure, by
obviating the need to prove fault, a no-fault plan might produce
administrative savings that would increase the percentage of the
premium dollar currently reaching the victim 8 That fact alone,
however, would be of little consolation to patients who are afflicted
Keeton, supra note 31, at 609-10.
See Letter from Crawford Morris to Senator Abraham Ribicoff, Aug. 28, 1969, in
SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 435, 447.
54. See, e.g., Andrew, MalpracticeSuits: The Increased Costs of Health Care, 8 TULSA
L.J. 223 (1972).
55. The total health bill in 1974 came to $104 billion of which $41 billion (or about 40%)
was paid by government expenditures. Washington Scene, 3 J. LEGAL MED., June, 1975, at
52.
56. Government and private health insurance together cover about 65% of all health
costs (90% of hospital bills and 61% of doctor bills). Bus. WEEK, May 26, 1975, at 72.
57. Estimates are that 20% of the American population have no private surgical or
hospital insurance; 20% have no in-hospital physician insurance; 55% carry no insurance for
visits to physicians; 49% have no insurance for prescribed drugs; and 93% do not have dental
insurance. See Bodenheimer, Cummings, & Harding, supra note 34, at 585. Moreover, because of exclusions for coverage, deductibles, and policy limits, the average family of four is
said to incur $350 in medical bills annually that are not covered by its insurance. See id.
58. See generally note 9 supra.
52.
53.
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with the higher medical costs that would assuredly materialize if all
iatrogenic injuries were even incompletely redressed.
Even if a national health plan were adopted in conjunction with
no-fault to redress economic losses so that the expense of health
care, including the costs of no-fault, could be spread throughout the
general population, the fairness of a no-fault alternative would remain open to question. Under a fault system individualization of
economic benefits, such as loss of earnings or diminution of earning
capacity, to reflect the pre-injury economic circumstances of the
victim arguably can be justified by the time honored adage that the
defendant takes the plaintiff as he finds him." Not only are defendants supposedly deterred, but as between the innocent and the
guilty parties, the latter purportedly should bear the loss as a matter
of rough justice. To the extent that a no-fault system would continue to individualize economic losses, however, it becomes subject
to challenge for preserving and reinforcing inequities in individual
social and economic circumstances that antedated the medical accident at taxpayers' or patients' expense." These problems would be
absent in an exclusively social security plan that would reimburse
only medical expenses, remedying essentially homogeneous risks.
Thus, a no-fault system, more than either a fault or social security
model, raises a serious "distributive justice""1 question, especially
in our increasingly egalitarian society.
A no-fault system also is subject to what has been labeled the
"bathtub argument." 2 In the medical accident context proponents
of this argument would question the justification for repairing losses
3
from medical accidents but not from a slip and fall in the bathtub.
Once fault is removed from the picture, it is difficult, as a matter
59. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 43, at 262 (4th ed. 1971).
60. Keeton, supra note 31, at 609. The effects of individualization in a no-fault system
also can be viewed not simply as preservation of the economic status quo, but in terms of a
transfer of wealth from poor patients to the rich ones. See Note, supra note 30, at 1156 n.80.
On the subject of the resilience of class barriers in the society generally, see Parker, Fact and
Fancy About America's "Classless Society, "Bus. & Soc'y REVIEW/INNOVATION, Summer 1974,
at 34-42.
61. The "distributive justice" problem is discussed from a slightly different perspective
in the automobile no-fault context in Blum & Kalven, supra note 16 at 364. The authors
observe that individualized recoveries exert pressure on policy makers either to differentiate
premiums (with wealthier individuals paying more since they might recover more by way of
economic loss) or to standardize certain risks by imposing.a ceiling on recoveries. Id. For a
conceptual analysis of the "distributive justice" notion, see Flynn & Ruffinengo, Distributive
Justice: Some Institutional Implications of Rawls' A Theory of Justice, 1975 UTAH L. REV.
123.
62. See, e.g., Keeton, supra note 31, at 612-13; Marx, Compensation Insurance for
Automobile Accident Victims: The Case for Compulsory Automobile Insurance, 15 OHIo ST.
L.J. 134, 148 (1954).
63. See Kretzmer, supra note 32, at 76.
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of fundamental fairness, to base one's right to compensation upon
the fortuity of having received the injury at the innocent hands of a
physician rather than from some other source.64 If we assume, as we
reasonably should, a present limit on the national willingness to
socialize injury, then we must inquire whether our limited resources
are better committed to plenary compensation for such things as
medical and economic losses and pain and suffering solely for victims of medical misadventures, rather than to the financing of medical services for all who require them without regard to the source
of the underlying condition. Again in terms of fairness, a national
health insurance plan would appear to be the better alternative.
C.

Effect on the Quality of Health Care

A central postulate of modern negligence law is that the imposition of liability is effective in deterring antisocial conduct.65 Adoption of a no-fault or a strict liability system that would no longer
distinguish innocent from blameworthy conduct would undermine
that premise. Admittedly, the validity of the threat of liability as a
deterrent against negligence has been questioned in recent years,6"
especially in the field of automobile accident law. 7 The automobile
cases, however, are distinguishable from medical malpractice. In
the former, the threat of civil liability adds little to the built-in
deterrent inhering in the fact that the personal safety of a negligent
driver is usually as imperiled as that of the victim. 8 Moreover, the
64. Ifhas thus been reasoned:
So long as the personal responsibility of some individual . . . defendant is insisted on
as a condition of entitlement to compensation, it naturally follows that only accidental
injuries will (in general) be compensated. But when we get to the stage . . . in which
the compensation is paid by the public in one way or another, and not by any individual,
the justification for distinguishing between accident and natural disability or disease
becomes less obvious.
P. ATIYAH, AccIDENTs, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 478 (1970); see generally W. BLUM & H.
KALVEN, PUauC LAW PERSPECr1VES ON APRIVATE LAW PROBLEM 37 (1965).
65. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMas, supra note 38, at § 12.3.
66. Id. § 12.4, at 755-57.
67. See, e.g., Conard, The Economic Treatment of Automobile Injuries, 63 MICH. L.
REV. 279, 292-93 (1964); Cramton, Driver Behavior and Legal Sanctions: A Study of
Deterrence, 67 MICH. L. Rav. 421, 445 (1969). Professor Cramton, while doubting the efficacy
of a threat of a money judgment as a deterrent in automobile cases, suggested that the
experience rating of automobile liability insurance premiums may have a deterrent impact.
Id.
68. See Lieberman, supra note 8, at 56. In addition to a deterrent influence of the
driver's personal fear of injury, careless driving might also be deterred by a fear of criminal
sanctions and loss of driving privileges. See P. KEETON & R. KEMN, supra note 17, at 52526. Thus, one questions how much the threat of civil liability really adds to already existing
deterrents to negligent vehicular operation. Moreover, there is some doubt whether substandard driving habits are really appreciated as such by the driver. Id. Others have been more
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potential deterrent effect of the prospect of losing insurance coverage or of the experience-rating of premiums based on one's liability
record, to the extent feasible and permitted by state law, 9 appears
more significant in medical malpractice in terms of the money at
stake and the effects of a loss of coverage." Fear of liability exceeding coverage and dread of notoriety also may promote care.
Support also exists for the proposition that the current fault
based system of liability does in fact encourage a higher quality of
medical care. 71 The absence of empirical evidence, however, makes
attempts to quantify the positive consequences of civil liability
problematic. At the very least, it would appear that the members
of the medical professions are acutely aware of and have an abiding
interest in their exposure to medical malpractice liability. This no
doubt has inspired some circumspect medical practices. Conversely,
the predisposition of the courts to distort malpractice law to compensate pathetic patients does little to foster confidence in capacity
of the present system to discriminate on the basis of fault. By the
same token, the purported dysfunctional effects and resource misallocation generated by the practice of defensive medicine" also must
be considered in any speculation about the overall effects of fault
reticent, less ready to concede the absence of meaningful deterrence in the threat of civil
liability for automobile accidents. See W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, supra note 69, at 62-63.
69. The actual deterrent effect of threats of cancellation, nonrenewal, and experience
rating of premiums has been eroded by a number of factors that were noted in Kendall &
Haldi, The Medical MalpracticeInsuranceMarket, in HEW REPORT, supra note 10, App. at
494. Carriers insuring through group plans have sometimes conditioned cancellation or nonrenewal upon action by a professional peer review committee. Id. at 508. Hospitals are often
rated for their professional and premise liability together, a fact which obscures the effect of
malpractice liability. Moreover, even where a practitioner's or institution's rate can legally
deviate from the rate approved by the insurance commissioner, state approval through a
"consent-to-rate" procedure may be required. While such a process might be feasible for large
institutional insureds, the comparatively modest size of individual premiums may not be
sufficient to justify the insurer's time. Ongoing evaluation of the quality of the individual's
practice would also be difficult to maintain. Id. at 534.
70. See notes 1-2, 4-5 supra.
71. One authority on the subject of quality control in medical services has stated:
From the viewpoint of quality controls, there is no question that the threat of malpractice suits is an inducement to elevate the diligence of medical performance. Since most
such suits involve the management of serious cases in hospitals, the influence is felt
strongly on the organization of medical staffs and other components of hospital operation. To some extent, the fear of malpractice actions may lead to extravagance. . . but,
on the whole, it is a powerful stimulus to establishing rules for encouraging thorough
work. It is also an inducement to careful medical record-keeping, which in turn helps to
promote better continuity of medical care.
Roemer, Controllingand Promoting Quality in Medical Care, 35 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 284,

297 (1970). See generally Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U.
PA. L. REv. 949 (1966). But see Carlson, supra note 27, at 353-54, where the author discusses
such countervailing factors as professional commiseration and the insulating effect of liability
insurance as mitigating the affects of civil liability on the quality of patient care.
72. See note 10 supra.
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based liability on the quality of health care.
From an economic standpoint the existing health industry, especially its professional practitioner component, appears constitutionally unresponsive, in terms of accident avoidance, to the economic incentives and disincentives of strict liability. Because of
uncertainty, perhaps inherent uncertainty, about the means of accident avoidance and the difficulties in organizing for research and
information dissemination, the imposition of strict liability probably would not enhance risk avoidance through collective action by
the physician-provider class.73
The application of strict liability to non-negligent iatrogenic
injuries as a means of reducing the costs of accidents also may be
attacked on a more theoretical plane. According to Professor Calabresi one of the goals of accident law is to minimize accidents and
accident avoidance costs, in other words to achieve "optimal deterrence."" To this end, Calabresi would have liability depend upon
which party was best suited to make the decisive cost-benefit analysis."h The pivotal inquiry would not evaluate the cost-benefit decision itself, but rather would identify the most suitable cost-benefit
analyst interested in the injury-producing transaction. Under such
a test, the costs of a significant portion of non-negligent injuries
might be borne by the patient rather than internalized by the health
care provider. These cases involve injuries resulting from the realization of calculated risks of therapy.
When calculated or inherent risks are involved, the doctrine of
informed consent" requires that the nature of the risks and alternative procedures be revealed to the patient. This doctrine emanates
from the patient's paramount "right of self-decision" 77 -- the right to
forego treatment and to make choices that might even be regarded
as foolish ones.78 One of the primary objectives of informed consent
73. See Note, supra note 30, at 1156-57.
74. Calabresi, Optimal Deterrenceand Accidents, 84 YALE L.J. 656 (1975).
75. Id. at 666.
76. See text accompanying notes 199-221 infra.
77. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972).
78. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 38, § 17.1 n.15, at 61 (Supp. 1968). The doctrine
of informed consent has been restated in terms of the patient's nearly unqualified right to
accept or reject diagnosis or treatment:
In ordinary malpractice cases the objectives of doctor and patient may be assumed to
coincide. Both want the best result medical science can produce. . . .But no such
assumption can safely be made on an issue of informed consent. The very foundation of
the doctrine is every man's right to forego treatment or even cure if it entails what for
him are intolerable consequences or risks, however warped or perverted his sense of
values may be in the eyes of the medical profession, or even of the community, so long
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has been "to promote individual autonomy," 79 and with such autonomy comes a corresponding obligation of the patients to accept
responsibility for the results of their informed decisions. 0 With the
physician standing sub potestate on the question of whether to proceed with therapy, it would seem that the patient is by definition
the more suitable party to perform the cost-benefit analysis and
therefore to bear the loss from voluntarily encountered, calculated
risks. One may question the assumption that patients can or do act
on the basis of the material risk information"1 or that they are really
in a better position than the physician to weigh those risks. Once
the decision on whether to proceed with specific treatment is legally
vested in the patient as a matter of fundamental right, however, the
patient perforce becomes the party who should "bear the incentive
to decide correctly. '82 Increasing patient access to medical informa-

tion relevant to his case, typified by patient "bills of rights,",, may
occasion even greater patient involvement in health care decisions
and concomitant responsibility.
The positive effects of threatened liability, the profession's suspected unresponsiveness to strict liability incentives, and the decisive role accorded the patient in the decision to encounter calculated risks of treatment all militate against the imposition of strict
liability on health care providers. Similarly, a mandatory first party
no-fault insurance plan compelling patients to insure against medical accidents, if substituted for the present system, also might undermine deterrence and perhaps discourage patient accountability
in terms of encountering known risks of treatment. One also senses
a visceral public attitude that doctors and other providers should
as any distortion falls short of what the law regards as incompetency.
Id. at 60-61.
79. Capron, Informed Consent in CatastrophicDisease Research and Treatment, 123
U. PA. L. REv. 340, 364-65 (1974).
80. Professor Capron observed, in the context of informed consent, that:
The freedom to make decisions for oneself carries with it the obligation to answer for
the consequences of those decisions. The requirement of consent for medical interventions thus serves to remind all the participants of their agreement concerning the procedure and their acceptance of those things which arise from its proper execution.
Id. at 365. See Note, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient, 83 YALE L.J. 1632, 1645-57
(1974). See also Greenfield, supra note 29, at 703-06.
81. Some have questioned whether patients really understand what they are consenting
to, suggesting that the patient's primary protection rests with the physician. See Ingelfinger,
Informed (But Uneducated) Consent, 287 N. ENG. J. MED. 465 (1972) (discussing experimental procedures). The solution for otherwise disenfranchised patients may lie in redoubled
efforts to insure their comprehension. See generally Capron, supra note 79, at 413-16.
82. Calabresi, supra note 74, at 666; see Note supra note 80, at 1645-46.
83. See, e.g., W. CURRAN & E. SHAPIRO, LAW MEDICINE AND FORENSIC SCIENCE 126-34
(Supp. 1974) (containing a varied sampling of patient's bills of rights); HEW REPORT, supra
note 10, at 71-77.
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not completely escape the scrutiny of a fault based liability system. 4 This feeling is reinforced in several ways. Interaction between
the physician and the patient is direct and personal, in marked
contrast to the product liability case in which a product leaves an
automated assembly line and reaches the consumer after passing
through the stream of commerce, or an automobile collision in
which a mechanical instrumentality is imposed between the parties
before the damage is inflicted. Thus, the professional medical relationship promotes a more emotional, even moralistic, and less objective public attitude toward the allocation of the loss. Furthermore,
direct governmental regulation and professional self-regulation have
been spasmodic and historically ineffective," inviting a perception
of the fault system as the only means of insuring professional accountability.
D. Future Prospects
Whatever the merits of the deterrence argument, public opinion probably will continue to countenance some form of fault system
until an effective or ostensibly effective means of policing the medical professional is demonstrated. Moreover, considering the costs,
definitional problems, and potential class bias of a no-fault plan for
medical accidents, the prospects for displacement of the present
system by a no-fault model may well have to await society's willingness to commit the resources necessary to redress all types of injuries and afflictions rather than merely those that are therapy induced.
In the meantime, several less sweeping changes are foreseeable.
A social security type national health insurance plan that would pay
for medical expenses regardless of the source of the injury probably
will be enacted. The existence of national health insurance should
foster a greater willingness to externalize some of the remaining
losses from medical accidents under the fault system. Thus, it
would not be surprising if damages for pain and suffering were eliminated or significantly curtailed in the future." In addition one might
84. See Lieberman, supra note 8, at 56.
85. The inadequacy of current governmental quality control measures has been frequently noted. See, e.g., Roemer, supra note 71; Worthington & Silver, Regulation of Quality
of Care in Hospitals: The Need for Change, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 305 (1970).

86. Classic articles on the subject of reform of torts rules governing recovery for pain
and suffering include Morris, Liability for Pain and Suffering, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 476 (1959);
Plant, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 200 (1958). More recently, the
validity of damages for pain and suffering has been questioned on a more technical plane.
The extent of the causal connection between the physical insult and the degree, duration,
and existence of a claimant's pain has been reexamined, along with the "social" content (its
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anticipate some overdue legislative revisions of the open ended "discovery rule"8 7 in statutes of limitations. Legislators mindful of the
costs of finding fault may also decide at least to supplement the
traditional method of trial by employing screening panels of experts
or arbitrators. Finally, the courts must eventually re-examine the
substantive law of malpractice if the fault system is to be retained
in any respect. Foremost in such a reappraisal will be the question
of the appropriate standard of care for members of the medical
profession and the role they should assume in formulating that standard.
1I.

THE PROFESSIONALLY DEVELOPED STANDARD OF CARE

A.

General Principles

Once it is clear that a duty is owed by the defendant to the
patient, a prima facie case of medical malpractice is made out by
producing evidence "which establishes the applicable standard of
care, demonstrates that this standard has been violated, and develops a causal relationship between the violation and the harm complained of."8 It is the first element, the applicable standard of care,
that animates the law of medical malpractice and that is most in
need of a thoroughgoing examination.
The theory underlying fault based compensation systems in
general and negligence law in particular presupposes some uniform
standard of behavior against which defendant's conduct is to be
tested. 9 It is not sufficient that the actor have performed at full
potential with the utmost good faith. Rather, he must have conpsychological and interpersonal aspect) of pain. See Peck, Compensation for Pain:A Reappraisal in Light of New Medical Evidence, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1355, 1360, 1367-68 (1974). See
generally Nemiah, The Psychological Aspects of Physical Injury, 3 LAwYER'S MED. J. 269 (2d
ed. 1975).
The inflationary effect of pain and suffering awards on the measure of recovery in medical
malpractice is manifest. See, e.g., Niles v. City of San Rafael, 42 Cal. App. 3d 230, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 733 (1974) ($1,604,371 awarded for pain and suffering). See generally Holder, Recent
Decisions on Pain and Suffering, 227 J.A.M.A. 1204 (1974).
87. There has been a decided judicial trend in medical malpractice cases in recent years
toward the adoption of the so called "discovery rule" which, greatly oversimplified, often
means that the statutory period commences to run when patient discovers or reasonably
should have discovered the wrong. See generally D. HARNEY, supra note 40, § 8.5; A. HOLDER,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW 322-24 (1975); 1 D. LOUISELL &H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
13.07, at 372-74 (Supp. 1974). The uncertainty the discovery rule insinuates into tort law
may be compounded in the medical malpractice context by the probable displacement of
occurrence-based liability insurance with a claims-based variety. See generally Comment,
The "Claims Made" Dilemma in Professional Liability Insurance, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 925
(1975).

88. Kosberg v. Washington Hosp. Center, Inc., 394 F.2d 947, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
89.

W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 32, at 149.

19751

THE "ACCEPTED PRACTICE" FORMULA

1235

formed to the standard of the "reasonable man of ordinary prudence." 9 The standard of care of the medical profession traditionally
has departed from this norm in several respects. As members of a
learned profession doctors and other health care professionals, who
were required to possess skill or knowledge beyond that of ordinary
individuals, have been required to act in a manner consistent with
that added capability." More significantly, it became 2 and probably continues to be 3 the prevailing rule that such defendants' conduct is judged in terms of a professionally developed standard of
care, sometimes expressed as the customary practice of other similarly situated members of the profession. Dean Prosser succinctly
stated the rule when he equated "good medical practice" with
"what is customary and usual in the profession."9 4 By comparison,
in negligence law generally compliance with the customary practice,9" while typically admissible as evidence" that defendant exercised due care, rarely is conclusive. 7 Similarly, in the nonmedical
90. This standard was apparently first stated in Vaughn v. Menlove, 3 Bing. N.C. 468,
132 Eng. Rep. 490 (1738). W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 32 at 150. Various other formulations
of essentially the same standard have included the reasonable man, the prudent man, the
man of average prudence, or a man of ordinary sense using ordinary care and skill. Id. The
"reasonable man" standard has been expressly adopted by the Restatement. RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965).
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289, comment m, § 290, comment f, § 299A,
comment b (1965). Thus, the comments to the Restatement state:
If the actor has in fact more than the minimum of these qualities, he is required to
exercise the superior qualities that he has in a manner reasonable under the circumstances. The standard becomes, in other words, that of a reasonable man with such
superior attributes.
Id. § 289 comment m.
92. For a thorough although somewhat dated discussion of the customary practice
standard of care for medical practitioners, see the late Professor McCoid's classic medical
malpractice piece, McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners,12 VAND. L. REV.
549, 605-09 (1959).
93. See note 115 infra and accompanying text.
94. W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 32, at 165. Prosser, however, is not entirely consistent.
Compare id. at 165, 168 n.90 with id. at 165 n.63.
95. Stated simply, a customary practice is a relatively well-defined and regular usage
or way of doing a specific thing followed by members of a trade, calling, or profession. 2 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 38, § 17.3, at 977; McCoid, supra note 92, at 605-07.
96. Professor Morris has explained the "three-fold relevancy" of evidence of conformity
to custom as follows:
First. Evidence of conformity warns that liability may have far reaching effects on the
fabric of business institutions...
Second. Evidence of conformity sharpens attention on the practicality of caution greater
than the defendant used...
Third. Lack of opportunity to learn of safeguards from his calling is one of the "circumstances" to be taken into account in deciding whether the defendant acted reasonably.
Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1147, 1147-49 (1942).
97. E.g., 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 38, § 17.3, at 977-78; W. PROSSER, supra
note 59, § 33, at 166-68; McCoid, supra note 92, at 610; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 295A (1965).
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cases expert testimony often will be necessary to afford guidance to
the trier of fact, but rarely will be as conclusive with respect to the
standard of care as it often is in medical malpractice cases.
B.

Professional Standard Redefined: The Accepted Practice
Formulation

A yawning need has existed for clarification and reappraisal of
the appropriate province of the medical profession in the formulation of the standard of care. The present section examines the form
a professionally developed standard of care might ideally assume.
In the section that follows, the more elemental question of whether
a standard fashioned by the profession should be controlling is considered.
(1)

Nature of the Accepted Practice Standard

Historically, the medical profession has been instrumental in
defining the standard of care for medical malpractice. The professional standard often has been enunciated in terms of customary
medical practice,9" emphasizing the typical conduct of the medical
practitioner. Courts also have sometimes added a further qualification by stating the standard with reference to a particular locality
or geographic setting.9 A better approach would require conformity
to the accepted professional standard. Practices approved by the
profession, not necessarily those customarily followed by its members, would be controlling. This model would encourage a uniformly
higher quality of care and at the same time preserve the essential
attributes of a professional standard. The accepted practice standard rarely has been articulated adequately or analyzed as a distinct measure of performance, although nomenclature consistent
with such a formula may be found in the case law,'10 in an occasional
statute,' 1 and in some commentary.' 2 The following paragraphs will
98. See W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 32, at 165; McCoid, supra note 92, at 605-09;
Morris, supra note 96, at 1163-67; Note, An Evolution of Changes in the Medical Standard
of Care, 23 VAND. L. REV., 721, 741-47 (1970); Note, supra note 30, at 1148-50; 28 VAND. L.
REV. 441, 445-47.
99. See generally discussion of the locality rules at text accompanying notes 111-21
infra.
100. See generally notes 124-27 infra and accompanying text.
101. See Tennessee Medical Malpractice Review Board and Claims Act of 1975, ch. 299,
§§ 14(a)(1), 17(a) [1975] Tenn. Pub. Acts 669, 671 (requiring, inter alia, that claimant in a
medical malpractice action prove "the recognized standard of acceptable professional practice in the profession and specialty thereof, if any, that defendant practices in the community
in which he practices or in a similar community . . ."). It remains to be seen whether the
Tennessee courts will simply interpret the foregoing provision to require compliance with the
professional custom, or will construe it in the broad "accepted practice" sense, with emphasis
on professionally approved practices rather than focusing merely on the habitual ones. The
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explore and explicate the essential nature of an accepted practice
standard of care as envisioned by the author.
If the customary practice is construed literally to mean the
medical custom, a customary practice standard of care might be
relegated to little more than professional habit. The controlling
standard thus would be defined exclusively in terms of medical
procedures that have occurred with sufficient regularity in the past
to become unmistakably etched into the practice of the profession.
This raises the spectre of the past elevated to prologue in the scientifically dynamic and fluid field of medicine. Moreover, it is specious to imagine that the health care market effectively allocates
medical resources so as to maximize the quality of health care.0 3
Therefore, it is not certain that medical custom, responding to imperfect market dynamics, will produce optimal health care. It does
not follow, however, that entirely jettisoning the professional
standard of care is the wisest course;" 4 rather, these realities militate in favor of refashioning the professional standard of care in
order to foster a higher quility of health care. A reasonable step in
this regard would be to articulate the standard in terms of the
professionally accepted practice. This formulation would continue,
with several possible exceptions, 15 the basic notion of a professionally developed standard of care. At the same time, such a rule would
alleviate or at least mitigate several of the potential shortcomings
of a professional standard based strictly on custom.
The standard as redefined offers three advantages. First, the
accepted practice formulation would make it clear that the profession's standard might be applicable to potential malpractice situations that involved novel medical conditions as well as otherwise
routine occurrences which take on an unprecedented aspect because
fact that the above statute retains a geographic limitation (same or similar community rule)
suggests that even if an accepted practice standard is followed, its geographic scope and thus
its potential for encouraging emulation of the highest state of the art will be limited to the
relevant geographic frame of reference.
102. Even where medical custom has been rejected, apparently in favor of "good" or
"acceptable medical practice," there is often little in the way of analysis of the nature of the
professional standard that would presumably survive abrogation of the customary practice
test. See D. HARNEY, supra note 40, § 3.1(A), at 89-90 & n.8, (B), at 90-91.
103. For a well-documented and persuasive analysis of the failure of the health care
market to efficiently or optimally allocate resources, see Note, supra note 30, at 1144-46. See
generally Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REv.
941 (1963). By contrast, Professor Posner's suggested justification for the customary practice
standard seems, by implication, to be based somewhat simplistically and perhaps improvidently upon the existence of a market in which the customary practice would produce optimal
care. See R. POSNER, ECONOMic ANALYSiS OF LAW 72 (1972).
104. See text accompanying notes 128-78 infra.
105. See text accompanying notes 178-220 infra.
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of the development of new medical techniques or treatment. The
standard would guide health care providers who are called upon to
respond to circumstances of first impression under the current state
of the art. While the customary practice standard, taken literally,
looks to the historical conduct of the profession, the accepted practice approach would focus on the "best standards of the day"'-the
reasonable expectations of the profession as to how its members
should manage the care of a patient. By eclectic reference to approved practices the medical profession should be able to determine
whether professional conduct for which no historical antecedents
exist nevertheless falls within the broad ambit of what is generally
perceived to be sound medical practice. Thus, the mere fact that a
particular situation has not yet been unequivocally addressed by a
settled custom should not prove fatal to a professional standard of
care.
Secondly, in keeping with the basic precept in negligence law
that the standard of care be based on an ideal paradigm, 7 the
accepted practice formula would not necessarily be based upon
what members of the profession customarily do. Instead the standard would depend upon what an ideal member would be expected
to do in order to conform to the approved professional practice. Here
again, the reasonable expectations of members of the profession
would be the crucial inquiry. Moreover, the accepted practice formula also should be subject to the rule that a physician must act
in a manner consistent with his best judgment.0 8 Doubts about the
relevance of the customary practice will no doubt continue to inhibit
sound innovative departures from even undesirable customs as long
as fear remains that such departures might establish a prima facie
case of malpractice. Unequivocal adoption of an accepted practice
standard should alleviate that problem, especially if it is made clear
that failure to adhere to a customary approach that did not comport
with sound medical practice would not be evidence of malpractice.,09
Thirdly, the accepted practice formula probably would be less
dependent on a discernible professional consensus than the customary practice standard. The latter impliedly assumes the existence
of a commonly practiced custom among a significant segment or at
106. Bradford, A Unique Decision, 2 J. LEGAL MED., Sept.-Oct. 1974, at 55.
107. W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 32, at 151.
108. Cf. Toth v. Community Hosp., 22 N.Y.2d 255, 262-63, 239 N.E.2d 368, 372-73, 292
N.Y.S.2d 440, 447 (1968) (physician must act with his best judgment even if it requires
precautions in addition to those customarily followed or accepted in the community).
109. Cf. id. at 263 n.2, 239 N.E.2d at 373 n.2, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 448 n.2.
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least a respectable minority"" of the profession. This leads to consideration of the geographic region from which a custom is to be derived and the degree of definiteness that must be demonstrated
concerning a consensus as to the usual medical practice.
The demise of the so-called "locality rules" have corhpounded
the problem of ascertaining a professional consensus. The locality
rules are in essence corollaries of the professional standard of care.
Many courts have defined the standard of care in terms of a specific
geographical setting and have looked to the practice in defendant's
community"' or in more recent decisions to the practice in the same
or similar communities."' The locality rules tended to reinforce the
customary practice principle where it was otherwise controlling and
greatly limited the experiential reference against which a defendant's conduct might be tested, thereby simplifying the determination of the customary practice. The locality rules proved objectionable because of their potential effect of insulating pockets of substandard medical practice and of severely restricting the pool of
available expert witnesses, essential participants in most malpractice cases." 3 Furthermore, this Balkanization of the profession was
inconsistent with the recognition of an increasingly universal medical science. Despite harsh criticism by commentators,"' some varia110. See 1 D. LOUTSELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 87, 8.04, at 204 (1973), where the
authors comment that "it appears well settled that if a physician pursues a course followed
by a 'respectable minority' of the profession, he is within the boundaries of permissible
conduct." (footnote omitted).
111. What was perhaps the most widely cited statement of the strict "same locality"
standard appears in Pike v. Honsinger, 155 N.Y. 201, 209, 49 N.E. 760, 762 (1898), in which
the New York Court of Appeals stated:
A physician. . . by taking charge of a case, impliedly represents that he possesses, and
the law places upon him the duty of possessing, that reasonable degree of learning and
skill that is ordinarily possessed by physicians and surgeons in the locality where he
practices.
The "same locality" rule is no longer the prevailing view in most jurisdictions. See Annot.,
37 A.L.R.3d 420 (1971).
112. The "same or similar locality" standard has been the most prevalent version of
the locality rules in recent years and continues to have substantial support. See, e.g., Goedecke v. Price, 19 Ariz. App. 320, 506 P.2d 1105, 1107 (1973); Siirila v. Barrios, 58 Mich. App.
721, 724, 228 N.W. 801, 803 (1975); Bailey v. Williams, 189 Neb. 484, 486, 203 N.W.2d 454,
456 (1973); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965); Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 420 (1971,
Supp. 1974) (physicians).
113. See Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 597 (1962).
114. See, e.g., D. HARNEY, supra note 40, § 3.3; A. HOLDER, supra note 87, at 52; 1 D.
LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 87,
8.07; Linden, The Negligent Doctor, 11 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 31, 37 (1973); Waltz, The Rise and GradualFall of the Locality Rule in Medical
MalpracticeLitigation, 18 DEPAuL L. REV. 408 (1969); Comment, Standard of Care for Medical Practitioners-Abandonmentof the Locality Rule, 60 Ky. L.J. 209 (1971); Note, Medical
Malpractice: "Locality" Rule Abandoned in Massachusetts, 23 S.W.L.J. 585, 589 (1969);
Note, An Evaluation of Changes in the Medical Standardof Care, 23 VAND. L. REv. 729, 730-
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tion of the locality rule (usually the "same or similar" locality) has
been applied to general practitioners"5 in many, and possibly the
majority, of the jurisidictions that have addressed the issue. A
goodly number of courts, however, have rejected the traditional locality rules for specialists"' and, in some cases, for general practitioners." 7 Some of these courts have stated that geography and location are not determinative, but are merely factors that may be considered in arriving at the applicable standard of care."'
If the professionally developed standard of care were completely rejected, the locality rules and any other geographic restrictions on the standard of care probably would disappear as well."'
The converse is not true because the adoption of a national standard
or at least the rejection of the traditional locality rules would not
by itself preclude a professionally fashioned standard of care; 2 ' it
41 (1970); Note, The Locality Doctrine and the Standardof Care of a Physician,8 WASHBURN
L.J. 339 (1969).
115. See D. HARNEY, supra note 40, § 3.3, at 96; Deitz, Baird & Berul, The Medical
MalpracticeLegal System, in HEW REPORT, supra note 10, App. at 87, 134; Significant Court
Decisions, Medical Malpractice-Status of the Locality Rule, 23 DEFENSE L.J. 178, 185
(1974); Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 420 (1971, Supp. 1974) (physicians). See generally Annot., 36
A.L.R.3d 440 (1971, Supp. 1974) (hospitals).
116. See, e.g., Kronke v. Danielson, 108 Ariz. 400, 499 P.2d 156 (1972); Naccarato v.
Grob, 384 Mich. 248, 254, 180 N.W.2d 788, 791 (1970). See generally Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 953
(1968, Supp. 1974).
117. Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370 (Ky. 1970) (general practitioner); Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968) (specialist; dictum as to general practitioners);
Shier v. Freedman, 58 Wis. 2d 269, 206 N.W.2d 166 (1973) (surgeon; dictum as to general
practitioners).
118. See, e.g., Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370, 373 (Ky. 1970); Shier v. Freedman, 58
Wis. 2d 269, 284, 206 N.W.2d 166, 174 (1973).
119. Rejection of the conclusiveness of the professional standard of care would in all
probability neutralize the locality rules, at least as they are currently employed. Nevertheless,
it is conceivable, although unlikely, that some form of geographical orientation might survive.
Since compliance with a professional standard probably still would be admissible as evidence
of due care, a court might choose to accord greater weight to proof of conformity with a
regional standard. Such an approach might be compared with the related principle advocated
in some cases that have rejected the traditional locality rules but have allowed the particular
circumstances in defendant's locality to be considered. See authorities cited note 118 supra.
Other possibilities also come to mind. For example, in Lejeune v. United States Cas. Co.,
227 F. Supp. 191 (W.D. La. 1964) (see note 193 infra for later developments in Louisiana law),
the court required that plaintiff initially prove thd local professional standard of care. Then
if it appeared that defendant had complied with that standard, plaintiff would be permitted
to show that the customary practice was negligent. Id. at 194. Thus, here too, it is conceivable
that a locality rule might survive when the court holds that the professional standard is no
longer conclusive, though permitting it to retain a measure of probative vitality by its effect
on the burden of going forward with the evidence.
120. In Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370 (Ky. 1970), for example, the court rejected a hard
and fast locality rule yet at the same time expressly reaffirmed the professional standard of
care, saying: "[Wie will not perpetuate a rule designed to protect country doctors in 1902,
but we will leave determination of the standard to the medical profession and not the lay
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would simply enlarge the professional frame of reference. Adoption
of a national standard would, however, make the ascertainment of
a consensus as to the medical custom an elusive goal if indeed a
national consensus even existed. By contrast, the accepted practice
variation of the professional standard would not depend on the existence of a demonstrable consensus on medical custom. It would
emphasize the reasonable expectations of the medical profession
nationally (or regionally if some geographic limitation on the standard survived). The existence of a consensus on medical custom,
while perhaps taken into account, would be less crucial than the
professional sense of what conduct was consistent with the collective
expectations of the profession. A practitioner would continue to
have the right to rely upon "one of several recognized courses of
treatment.""2 ' Under the accepted practice standard, however, this
range of permissible courses of treatment would be confined to those
approved by rather than those necessarily followed by the profession.
(2)

Ascertaining the Accepted Practice Standard

In most situations there would probably be little significant
difference between customary and accepted practice. When medical
practitioners are plying their art in a manner that members of the
profession would generally expect and desire, the custom would
represent the professionally accepted practice. In actual fact, the
difference between the two standards is more a matter of perspective and emphasis than of distinct medical systems separated by a
discrete interface.
Proof of the accepted practice normally would require expert
testimony, but experts would not be asked to survey only the
medical tradition and habit; rather, they would offer their opinion
about the reasonable expectations that the profession collectively
holds for its members. The expert would draw upon his own educational and practical frame of reference as well as upon relevant
medical thinking, as manifested by literature, educational resources
courts." Id. at 373. See, e.g., Francois v. Mokrohisky, 226 N.W.2d 470, 472 (Wis. 1975)
(following a professional though not a geographically limited standard).
121. Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A.2d 82, 87 (Me. 1974); see Chumbler v. McClure, 505 F.2d

489, 492 (6th Cir. 1974) (stating that the standard of care is "not to be determined solely by
a plebiscite"); Dillmann v. Hellman, 283 So. 2d 388, 389 (Fla. App. 1973). In Tarasoff v.
Regents of University of California, 13 Cal. 3d 177, -,
529 P.gd 553, 560, 118 Cal. Rptr.
129, 136 (1974), noted in 28 VAND. L. REV. 631 (1975), the court stated that "within that broad

range in which professional opinion and judgment may differ respecting the proper course of
action, the psychotherapist is free to exercise his own best judgment free from liability. .. "
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and information available to practitioners,1 2 and experiences of
similarly situated members of the profession. It may be argued that
such an eclectic approach is too subjective, that it seeks to ascertain the unascertainable-namely, the brooding judgment of the
medical collegium on the professionally acceptable level of performance of its members. The same can be said, however, of expert
testimony generally. Indeed, the rationale for requiring expert witnesses is that the educated speculation of the experts will temper
and guide the less informed speculation of the triers of fact. Disagreement among experts concerning the accepted practice would
be resolved in the same way conflicts are resolved whenever expert opinions collide. The expert's background, qualifications, demeanor, and general persuasiveness, along with the degree to which
the record consistently accommodates the various expert testimony,
all would be relevant to the trier of fact in evaluating expert opinions.
An expert's opinion of the accepted practice need not be any
more subjective or speculative than an attempt to identify the customary practice. It is doubtful whether the customary practice criterion, even with its historical perspective and therefore its ostensibly
more empirical antecedents, produces a more uniform, predictable,
or ascertainable standard. Certainly, as the geographic frame of
reference enlarges with the demise of the locality rules, the likelihood of discovering a clearly defined medical custom becomes illusory. Even if a commonly held medical custom for a particular set
of facts were static and could be assayed by plebiscite or some
sampling technique, such procedures have seldom been attempted,
and would hardly be economically feasible in any event. The expert's perception of accepted practice, by contrast, would not rely
even in principle upon impossible head counts. Along with a sense
of the custom among practitioners and of his own notion of profes122. This expansive source of the expert's opinion under the accepted practice standard
is consistent with recent decisions holding that a medical expert may be competent to testify
even though his familiarity with the applicable standards is not based on "occupational
experience" as such. See, e.g., Cline v. Lund, 31 Cal. App. 3d 755, 766, 107 Cal.Rptr. 629,
637 (1973). See generally Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 275 (1972); Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 1163 (1970).
In the later case of Brown v. Coln, 11 Cal. 3d 639, 522 P.2d 688, 114 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1974)
(en banc), the California supreme court held that it was prejudicial error to refuse to allow
an expert to testify as to the standard of care applicable to a 1949 operation even though the
expert had not yet been admitted to practice medicine in 1949. The court emphasized that
the expert had experience as a practicing physician (although he acquired his experience
about ten years after the alleged malpractice) and had made an exhaustive study of the
medical literature. The court further observed that medical literature may sometimes be a
more reliable guide for the standard of care for a 1949 operation than the testimony of one
who had practiced medicine in that year. Id. at 645, 522 P.2d at 691, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
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sional responsibility, under the accepted practice approach, the
expert would look to the best of available medical literature and to
the increasingly standardized 113 educational outpourings from medical schools, professional associations, and elsewhere. These latter
sources of information are in essence emanations of professionally
accepted practice. Furthermore, they are often memorialized and
thus offer greater accessibility than one would normally find by
surveying the disparate therapeutic approaches of the practicing
profession. Thus, the profession's customs would be cognizable
under an accepted practice standard, but even time honored practices that were manifestly inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of the profession would not be condoned. Understood as such,
the accepted practice standard is likely to encourage practitioners
to stay abreast of sound medical technique. Additionally, it represents a more discernible and forward looking standard than is afforded by referring exclusively to habit or popular lore among practitioners.
The foregoing distinction between accepted and customary
practice has seldom been articulated in the case law or elsewhere.
It seems that the courts have been so preoccupied with alleviating
the harshness of the locality rules that the gestalt of the professional
standard rarely has been probed. The language employed in various
decisions to express the standard of care has run the gamut; in some
cases it seemingly is consistent with the customary practice
standard," 4 in others with the accepted practice formulation," 5 and
in still others language is used that perhaps is reconcilable with
either standard."' Unfortunately, the full potential significance of
the difference in terminology has largely eluded the courts. In some
instances, the courts have chosen to regard the matter as one of
123. See Thorne, supra note 7, at 17-29. The training of physicians is probably the most
standardized and centrally controlled of all of the professions. Id. at 82.
124. See, e.g., Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A.2d 82, 88 (Me. 1974) (plaintiff must prove a
departure from the "general custom and practice in the profession"); Bailey v. Williams, 189
Neb. 484, 486, 203 N.W.2d 454, 456 (1973) (physician required to employ that degree of care
and skill that physicians in the relevant geographic areas "would ordinarily exercise and
devote to the benefit of their patients"); Siirila v. Barrios, 58 Mich. App. 721, 723, 228 N.W.2d
801, 802 (1975) (plaintiff must prove that defendant's conduct fell short of that "ordinarily
done").
125. See, e.g., Francois v. Mokrohisky, 226 N.W.2d 470, 472 (Wis. 1975) (plaintiff
required to prove that defendant's actions did not comport with the "approved medical
practice under the circumstances").
126. Jury instructions approved in Hickman v. Employers' Fire Ins. Co., 311 So.2d 778,
779 (Fla. App. 1975), at one point emphasized "the course recognized as correct by his
profession," implying an accepted practice approach. Later, however, the court approved a
standard apparently based on what other similarly situated physicians "would have done,"
indicating more of a customary practice standard. Id. at 779.
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semantic shadings, a tendency no doubt partly attributable to the
fact that the difference between the trial court's instructions and
those urged by counsel was not sufficiently discrete to appear potentially outcome-determinative or likely to influence significantly a
127

jury.

In summary, the strict customary practice rule appears incompatible with a rapidly changing science and may glorify medical
custom without due regard for advances in the state of the art.
Moreover, a customary practice approach seems impliedly to assume a consensus regarding the medical custom, at least among a
significant segment of the profession. Custom is an elusive standard
at best, especially as the geographic perspective continues to expand with the erosion of the locality rules. By comparison, the accepted practice standard, emphasizing as it does the performance
expectations of the profession rather than the professional habit of
its members, avoids the more onerous limitations of the customary
practice principle, and promises to foster a generally higher quality
of medical care.
Once the anatomy of the professional standard is settled, the
more critical question comes into sharper relief: whether a
professionalstandard should constitute the standard of care in medical malpractice and thus be accorded conclusive weight by the
courts. This question is explored in the following sections.
C. The Case for a ProfessionallyDeveloped Standard of Care
A difficult and recurrent question facing courts and legislatures
concerns the role that the medical profession should play in formulating the standard of care. Should conformity to the professional
standard of conduct, based on the customary or, preferably, the
accepted medical practice, conclusively establish the defendant's
due care or simply constitute evidence that the finder of fact may
accept or reject? Couched somewhat differently, the question becomes whether the testimony of expert medical witnesses should
establish the standard of care, or whether it should merely afford
guidance to the trier of fact on the feasibility of the various available
courses of action, the trier of fact then applying a reasonable person
standard. Conceptually, the professional standard of care and the
127.

In Massey v. Heine, 497 S.W.2d 564, 566 (Ky. 1973), the trial court's instruction

stated as the standard of care that "which ordinarily careful practitioners ordinarily use."
Plaintiff's counsel urged that the court should have instructed that the defendant was obliged
"to exercise that degree of care as would be exercised by a [sic] ordinarilycareful physician."
Despite plaintiff's express attack on the customary practice standard, due perhaps to the
similarity of the language challenged to that urged by plaintiff, that underlying issue was not
reached by the court. Id.
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reasonable person standard potentially are mutually exclusive.
Either the conduct of the medical practitioner is to be tested by the
professionally accepted practice, when relevant, or it is not. To defer
to the professional standard except when following that standard is
perceived as negligence under a reasonable person test is not to defer
to the medical profession at all, but to relegate it to something less
than a standard of care in the traditional negligence sense.
Although commentators are divided on the issue,'28 the prevailing view in the courts seems to favor a professionally established
standard of care. Cases adhering to some form of locality rule"2 9
usually should be viewed as embracing a professional standard of
care. When the common knowledge130 and informed consent 3' cases
as well as those cases holding simply that the physician must exercise his best judgment even in the face of a less rigorous community
practice, 32 are distinguished, few cases remain that have attacked
128. Many commentators have favored a professional standard of care for medical
malpractice or at least have recognized it without dissent as the prevailing view. See, e.g.,
D. HARNEY, supra note 40, § 3.1(A), (B) (opposing the customary practice standard but
otherwise accepting the idea of a professional standard); W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 32, at
165; Bradford, A Unique Decision, 2 J. LEGAL MED., Sept.-Oct. 1974, at 52; McCoid, supra

note 92, at 605-09; Morris, supra note 96, at 1163-67; Comment, 6 TEx. TzcH. L. REv. 279,
284 (1974); Comment, 28 VAND. L. REv. 441, 450-53 (1975). Others have opposed an unqualified, professionally-developed standard, at least one based exclusively upon customary practice. Note, 23 VAND. L. REV., supra note 98, at 741-47; Note, supra note 30, at 1149-50,
discussed at note 159 infra and accompanying text.
In some instances the issue of the professional standard (especially when equated with
customary practice) has inspired some uncertainty. Thus, the authors of one leading text have
observed that ". . . [pirobably the conventional standard whereby reasonableness is measured by customary practice, has worked out fairly well on the whole." 1 D. LOUIsELL & H.
WILLIAMS, supra note 87, 8.04, at 203 (1973). In their supplement, however, the same authors
equivocated that "practicing medicine according to the custom in the community does not,
of itself, necessarily create immunity from tort liability." Id. at 89 n.632 (Supp. 1974). Then
recanting somewhat (perhaps tacitly keeping the door ajar for the "accepted practice" version
of the professional standard), the authors noted that the "[clourts have not clearly set forth
the exact amount of weight to be accorded to custom." Id. Another text has exhibited similar
dubiety. See A. HOLDER, supra note 87, at 50. Essentially this author opines that adherence
to the local professional standard constitutes due care unless it is negligent. The crucial
question - negligent by what standards - is passed over. Is negligence to be tested by a
nationalprofessional standard of care or by a reasonable person standard, which would nullify
a professional standard? The author's statement, without more, fails adequately to address
the question. Even Prosser has evidenced such confusion. See note 94 supra.
129. See authorities cited note 112 supra. The locality rules essentially are, statements
of the professional standards of care in terms of a specific geographical frame of reference.
130. See text accompanying notes 178-97 infra.
131. See text accompanying notes 199-221 infra.
132. In Toth v. Community Hosp., 22 N.Y.2d 255, 262, 239 N.E.2d 368, 372, 292
N.Y.S.2d 440, 447 (1968), the court stated that "evidence that a physician conformed to
accepted community standards of practice usually insulates him from tort liability." However, the court went on to hold:
If a physician fails to employ his expertise or best judgment. . . he should not automati-
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the professional standard of care. Most of these decisions seem to
attack the customary practice variation,'33 and are not particularly
overwhelming.13 4 Indeed, the tendency to think of the professional
standard exclusively in terms of the customary practice may help
to explain the apparent willingness of most of these courts to question the professional standard so perceived.'35 Most of the decisions
rejected the custom standard and did not really address the feasibility of an accepted practice approach. One wonders how they might
have responded if counsel had urged that the medical custom test
be replaced with the accepted practice variation of the professional
standard.
With such sparse authority for an across the board rejection of
the professional standard of care and with the courts' primary
cally be freed from liability because in fact he adhered to acceptable practice. There is
no policy reason why a physician, who knows or believes there are unnecessary dangers
in the community practice, should not be required to take whatever precautionary measures he deems appropriate.
Id. at 263, 239 N.E.2d at 373, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 447.
133. See note 135 infra. See also note 193 infra.
134. See, e.g., Darling v. Charlestown Community Mem. Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211
N.E.2d 253 (1965) (hospital defendant); Lundahl v. Rockford Mem. Hosp. Ass'n, 93 111. App.
2d 461, 235 N.E.2d 671 (1968) (dictum; physician defendant); Morgan v. Sheppard, 91 Ohio
L. Abs. 579, 188 N.E.2d 808 (1963); Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971);
Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974); Favarola v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
144 So.2d 544 (La. App. 1962). See also notes 191, 193 and accompanying text.
135. Most of the cases cited in note 134 supra,that purport to limit the conclusiveness
of the professional standard, couched their language in terms of the "customary practice" or
"custom." Although none of the cases expressly opted for an "accepted practice" standard,
at least one case, by emphasizing that a physician must give "due regard to the advanced
state of the profession," came close to the spirit, if not the letter, of an accepted practice
formulation. See Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 283, 282 A.2d 206, 217 (1971). The case of
Favarola v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 144 So. 2d 544 (La. App. 1962) (which rejected the
customary practice relating to precautions to be taken to prevent patient from falling during
an x-ray examination), has been narrowly construed. One case has limited it to situations
involving negligence per se. See Chapman v. Argonaut-Southwest Ins. Co., 290 So. 2d 779,
786 (La. App. 1974). Another case has construed Favarolaas holding that conformity to the
local custom will not relieve defendant of liability where that practice is contradicted by the
accepted professional practice in accordance with the teaching in medical schools. See Davis
v. Duplantis, 448 F.2d 918, 920 (5th Cir. 1971). In most cases cited in note 134 supra, it does
not appear that the accepted practice alternative was even considered. Moreover, in subsequent decisions some courts have suggested that the professional standard of care may well
have survived, at least to some extent, the earlier attacks on the customary practice
formulation. See, e.g., Ohligschlager v. Proctor Community Hosp., 55 Ill. 2d 411, 417, 303
N.E.2d 392, 396 (1973) (recognizing professional standard for physician without mentioning
customary practice); Richardson v. Doe, 176 Ohio St. 370, 372, 199 N.E.2d 878, 879 (1964)
(recognizing the professional standard but qualifying custom by requiring due regard for "the
present state of medical science"). Of the cases cited in note 134 supra, only Helling v. Carey,
83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974), unequivocally rejected (under the facts presented) the
professional standard of care without even ostensible concern over whether that standard was
based on a customary or accepted practice or upon some other professional referent.
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attention riveted on the locality rules, the vague ruminations about
the place of the profession in the formulation of the standard of care
might well have continued unabated. The situation changed abruptly in 1974 when the Washington Supreme Court decided
Helling v. Carey3 ' and addressed directly the conclusiveness of the
professional standard of care without being distracted by peripheral
questions of locality or custom.'37
Plaintiff in Helling while in her early twenties consulted defendant ophthalmologists with complaints of nearsightedness and was
fitted with contact lenses. After several years plaintiff again consulted defendants to complain of irritation caused by the contact
lenses. Five years later, after additional visits to the defendants, a
test of plaintiff's intraocular eye pressure and field of vision revealed
that plaintiff was afflicted with advanced glaucoma and had sustained severe irreversible damage to her eyes. It was estimated that
the disease had been present for ten years or longer before it was
diagnosed. The consensus of the testimony of both parties' medical
experts established that the standards of the profession did not
require routine glaucoma tests for patients under forty years of
age. "' According to some testimony, the incidence of glaucoma in
persons under the age of forty was thought to be approximately one
in 25,000.Y The testimony also indicated that the professional standards do require pressure tests where the patient's complaints suggested possible glaucoma. "' There was, however, no intimation from
the opinion that the patient's complaints themselves called for a
glaucoma test significantly earlier than the one actually performed.
According to defendant's testimony, the pressure test was performed thirty days after plaintiff first complained of visual field
problems. Based on essentially the above record, the jury rendered
a verdict for the defendants, and the trial court entered a judgment
accordingly, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court reversed, and held
defendants liable as a matter of law for not having routinely
administered the glaucoma test at a time when the disease might
have been arrested, presumably years earlier. The court's conclu136. 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974), noted in 10 GoNz. L. REv. 220 (1974); 20
N.Y.L.F. 669 (1975); 6 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 279 (1974); 28 VAND. L. REv. 441 (1975); 11 WILL.
L.J. 152 (1974).
137. Rather than speak of the custom, the court expressly stated the issue in terms of
the effect of defendants' "compliance with the standard of the profession of ophthalmology."
83 Wash. 2d at 517, 519 P.2d at 982.
138. Id. at 517, 519 P.2d at 982.
139. Id. at 518, 522, 519 P.2d at 983, 985.
140. Id. at 516, 519 P.2d at 982.
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sion was based on its weighing of the cost, simplicity, and definitiveness of the glaucoma test, the incidence of the disease, and the
gravity of the injury that may result when the disease is not detected
and treated.
Helling is probably a classic case of hard facts making bad law.
The plaintiff's plight no doubt evoked a great deal of sympathy.
Under such circumstances, one might possibly have expected a reversal and new trial based upon some technical error or perhaps an
especially creative characterization of the facts. Any real ambiguity
as to the thrust of the court's holding as a matter of law, however,
probably was dispelled by its express reliance on Judge Learned
Hand's immortal opinion in T.J. Hooper,'4 ' the leading case rejecting the conclusiveness of standards set by a single industry or enterprise. In the final analysis, Helling rejected the professional standard as applied to routine glaucoma testing and potentially rejected
the professional standard for other medical procedures as well, especially if the procedures do not involve an extensive exercise of professional discretion or judgment. " '- The Helling decision, with its
unembarrassed examination of the professional standard question,
takes on tremendous significance, and has already excited considerable comment."' The full impact of this terse opinion must await
elaboration by the Washington courts and the reaction of other
jurisdictions. It nevertheless serves as a useful foil for developing the
following arguments that are urged in support of the professional
standard of care.
(1)

Limitations of Trier of Fact

A common justification for the professional standard of care is
141. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932). Judge Hand, speaking for the court, wrote:
[l]n most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is never
its measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices. It never may set its own tests, however persuasive be its usages. Courts
must in the end say what is required; there are precautions so imperative that even their
universal disregard will not excuse their omission.
Id. at 740.
142. In Helling the court noted that there was "no judgment factor involved." 83 Wash.
2d at 518, 519 P.2d at 983. But see Bradford, supra note 128.
143. The case has elicited a wide range of negative commentary. See Letter from Lawrence S. Charfoos, 18 PER. INJURY NEWSLETTER 79 (1974) (member of the plaintiffs' bar,
characterizing the decision as "a disaster"); Curran, Glaucoma and Streptococcal Pharyngitis: Diagnostic Practices and Malpractice Liability, 291 N. ENG. J. MED. 508 (1974) (describing Helling as an overly terse opinion that "leaves much to be desired"); Bradford,
supra note 128; Comment, 28 VAND. L. REv. 441 (1975). Not all of the reaction, even by
members of the medical profession, has been negative; however. See, e.g., Dusinberre,
Diagnostic Screening and Malpractice, 292 N. ENG. J. MED. 597 (1975); Note, YALE L.J.,
supra note 30, at 1149, 1163.
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that lay jurors and judges are simply not equipped to wrestle with
the complexities of medical science. 44 This argument, without
more, may be an oversimplification. Judges and juries have always
been called upon to decide difficult, complex questions. Additionally, the nonconclusiveness of the professional standard does not
necessarily mean that the trier of fact would be without expert
guidance. 45' Indeed, one would expect that cases rejecting the professional standard would nevertheless continue to require the testimony of expert witnesses to establish, under a reasonable person
standard, what courses of action were scientifically feasible under
the circumstances. The real question is not whether the scientific
matter in controversy is or can be made comprehensible to laymen.
Rather, it is the more fundamental issue of the proper allocation of
medical decision-making responsibility. Should medical decisions
that are not a matter of common knowledge be evaluated by the ad
hoc judgment of a lay judge or lay jurors aided by hindsight'46 and
an often unrealistic set of medical expectations?'4 7 Or, should such
decisions depend on the collective judgment of the medical profession? The latter alternative manifestly appears to be the more defensible one. Deference to the professional standard is not simply a
matter of inter-professional comity. It is a function, according to
Prosser, of the "healthy respect which the courts have had for the
learning of a fellow profession, and their reluctance to overburden
it with liability based on uneducated judgment."'4
How then, should a case like Helling v. Carey be decided?
Glaucoma is certainly an insidious and dreaded disease. The court
apparently believed that if the pressure test had been routinely and
timely administered the disease's destructive processes might have
144. See McCoid, supra note 92, at 607-08; Morris, supra note 96, at 1164.
145. Rejection of the conclusiveness of the professional standard does not necessarily
affect the requirement for expert testimony. "Expert testimony could [still] be utilized to
enlighten. . . laymen without allowing conformity to their testimony to become a conclusive
defense." Note, 23 VAND. L. REV., supra note 98, at 743. Indeed, the court in Helling apparently relied on expert testimony regarding the simplicity, expense, and definiteness of the
glaucoma test.
146. Retrospective lay evaluation of professional conduct is fraught with more than the
usual risk of injustice where the science is as fluid and dynamic as the practice of medicine.
The long delays before trial and the fact that many cases under recent statute of limitations
decisions may have been based on conduct occurring years in the past under far different
conditions threaten further to distort judge or jury objectivity and perspective. See note 87
supra.
147. Unrealistic public expectations of miraculous cures have been noted as a contributing factor in the continuing explosion in malpractice litigation. See, e.g., THE PATIENT
VERSUS THE PHYSICIAN, supra note 7, at 447.
148. W. PROSSER, supra note 59, at 165.
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been retarded. Weighing the evidence, the court made the following
pronouncement:
The precaution of giving this test to detect the incidence of glaucoma to patients under 40 years of age is so imperative that irrespective of its disregard
by the standards of the ophthalmology profession, it is the duty of the courts
to say what is required to protect patients under 40 from the damaging results
of glaucoma.'49
A relevant cost-benefit study 5 ' or independent medical opinion' 5 '

may subsequently validate or at least lend some support to the
court's holding from the medical perspective. The decision as rendered by the court, however, is difficult to justify. The court did not
allude either to an officially sanctioned study or to a respectable
body of medical opinion that compelled the routine administration
of the pressure test to persons under the age of forty. The danger in
the court's apparent break with the medical profession lies not so
much in the merits of the court's medical conclusion, which may
even turn out to be medically sound, but in what the court's method
may portend. The court unwisely has arrogated to itself medical
decisions, superimposing its medical judgment upon the collective
experience of the medical profession. Can it really be said that
medical judgments of the courts will be "right" more often than
those guided by approved medical practices? The case has provoked
the following criticism from one physician:
Such matters must not be determined by common consumerist opinion, the
press, presently popular medical copy, or even by the court. The best methods
149. 83 Wash. 2d at 519, 519 P.2d at 983.
150. If there were any extant cost-benefit studies that supported the court's medical
decision, they were not expressly relied upon in the opinion. Parenthetically, it is interesting
to contrast the court's decision not only with the professional standards, but also with the
conclusion drawn in the somewhat different context of public screening for glaucoma. Despite
the seriousness of the disease and the availability of diagnostic tests, one expert writing in a
prestigious British medical journal commented that "[tihe prevalence of glaucoma is too low
and the methods of detection such as to make population screening an uneconomic use of
medical resources at present." Crick, Chronic Glaucoma: A PreventableCause of Blindness,
THE LANCET 205, at 207 (1974) (footnote omitted).
151. One physician has made the following general remark in support of the Helling
decision: "The simplification and cheapening of many tests . . .have put an obligation on
medicine to make them routine for special situations ...." Dusinberre, supra note 142, at
597; cf. Kaufman, Questions and Answers - Maintenance of Tonometer Sterility in Glaucoma Screening, 232 J.A.M.A. 849 (1975) ("Testing for glaucoma should be part of every
routine thorough physical examination"). For a less enthusiastic, more specific scientific
appraisal of the opinion, which raises some questions, inter alia, as to the conclusions of the
majority and concurring opinions with respect to the simplicity and definitiveness of the
glaucoma pressure tests, see Bradford, supra note 128. In this vein, in another case involving
an ophthalmologist-defendant, expert testimony estimated that there were 40 or 50 different
diseases all producing elevated intra-ocular pressure readings. See Evans v. Sarrail, 208 Cal.
App. 2d 478, 480, 25 Cal. Rptr. 424, 425 (1962).
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of discovery, diagnosis, and treatment for the best interest of the patient will
ultimately evolve from the findings of the experts and professionals in the field
and not from the court. The acceptable standard of care should be the best
standard of the day, and it will only be2 determined by research and findings
of the most knowledgeable in the field. 1

The medical profession in Washington may now have to assume
that Helling has abruptly become a standard treatise for at least
ophthalmology residents and practitioners. If the medicine practiced in Helling is safe and represents an optimal assignment of
medical resources, will the court's future prescriptions be likewise?
Will courts, impressed by often deceptive appearances of safety,
diagnostic definitiveness, and in retrospect relative inexpensiveness, now routinely engage in all manner of major diagnostic and
therapeutic intervention? Must every patient be solicited to undergo a comprehensive battery of tests to protect the doctor? Will
revision of the Helling recipe or other judicially developed regimens
of diagnosis or therapy have to await the indefinite prospect of
future elaboration by the highest court of the state? The spectre
thus rises of an improvident, legal-based science of medicine that
could further petrify the healing arts"' and strike at the very institutional integrity of the medical profession. Nor does it follow that if
a court adheres to the professional standard, dangerous practices
will go unchecked or required procedures will be ignored. When the
negative aspects of a medical technique have been demonstrated by
systematic and reliable studies, the accepted practice standard
would probably compel repudiation of the untoward practice. In
appropriate cases, specific medical procedures might even be required by statute or regulation.
(2)

Cost- and Risk-Benefit Considerations

The use of a professionally developed standard of care, specifically a customary practice rule, in medical malpractice cases has
been explained on the ground that the market dynamics of free
152. Bradford, supra note 128, at 55.
153. Even where an ophthalmologist responds to an elevated intra-ocular pressure reading by aggressively treating the patient for suspected glaucoma, he may still be sued. A
patient who was treated for glaucoma after "borderline" pressure readings were noted,
charged that she did not have glaucoma and that the treatment caused mental suffering and
fear resulting from allegedly faulty advice to avoid pregnancy. See Evans v. Sarrail, 208 Cal.
App. 2d 478, 480, 25 Cal. Rptr. 424, 425 (1962). This lawsuit ended in a directed verdict for
the defendant (there being no evidence of negligence, the court applied a professional standard of care). It nevertheless serves to illustrate the potential "damned-if-you-do, damnedif-you-don't" syndrome facing doctors, if their decisions were permitted to be second-guessed
by lay triers of fact. One wonders how a jury might have decided the Evans case had it been
given a free hand to exercise its untutored medical judgment.
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enterprise will operate to produce optimal health care consistent
with a balancing of the costs and risks of therapy and the anticipated benefits that therapy offers.' 4 It is implied that a customary
practice may represent an acceptable, economically self-policing
standard for activities when the party threatened by the enterprise
is also the customer, which is usually the case with medical serv"' though perhaps not with certain other professions.'5 6 Others
ices, 55
have doubted the validity of the customary practice standard, persuasively challenging one of its underlying premises-that a health
care market exists that effectively and optimally allocates medical
resources' 7 and have suggested that the conclusiveness of the customary practice standard be rejected unless it has been validated
by a "systematic cost-benefit analysis."' 58 Neither of the foregoing
views is really the answer. Customary practice insulates professional
habit,'5 9 while the validation requirement seems overly narrow and
probably goes too far toward the other extreme. It impliedly rejects
the middle ground-the retention of the professional standard based
upon the accepted rather than the customary medical practice.'
The validation approach presumably would employ a reasonable
person standard as in Helling, absent the existence of a systematic
cost-benefit analysis, a proposition that is premised upon the
154. See R. POSNER, supra note 103, at 71-72.
155. See id. While the party generally threatened by medical procedures is the patient,
a number of courts have found, in some circumstances, that a duty was owed to certain
nonpatient third parties. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 13 Cal. 3d 177, 529
P.2d 553, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974), noted in 28 VAND. L. REv. 631 (1975).
156. On this and other grounds, use of the customary practice standard has been questioned in the accounting field. See, e.g., Fiflis, CurrentProblemsof Accountants' Responsibilities to Third Parties,28 VAND. L. Rav. 31, 84-86 (1975). The author went to some lengths to
distinguish the medical from the accounting profession in terms of the possible feasibility of
the customary practice standard. See id. With the exception of the greater relative danger
posed to third parties by the activities of accountants as compared with physicians, the two
professions are perhaps more akin from the standard of care perspective than Professor Fiflis
is willing to concede. Though it is beyond the scope of the present inquiry, one wonders how
an "accepted practice" standard of care, as advocated herein, might fare in the law governing the professional liability of accountants.
157. See note 103 supra and accompanying text.
158. Note, supra note 30, at 1150. For a discussion of the renewed interest of cost-benefit
analysis theories as well as the difficulties involved in the use of such techniques, see Bus.
WEEK, June 30, 1975, at 114.
159. See text accompanying notes 98-127 supra.
160. This middle ground may have been vaguely hinted at by the commentator's acknowledgement of a rule making custom a defense rebuttable by proof that defendant lagged
behind the "new knowledge" of the profession. See Note, supra note 30, at 1150 n.49. This
avenue, however, was apparently rejected (or at least not endorsed) as a solution for cases
not covered by a systematic cost-benefit analysis. See id. at 1150. This observation is reinforced by the commentator's express approval of Heling v. Carey, a case clearly rejecting an
accepted professional standard of care (as applied to the facts of the instant case). See id. at
1149.

1975]

THE "ACCEPTED PRACTICE" FORMULA

1253

groundless assumption that the courts are more likely to make optimal medical judgments than is the medical community.
Certainly, when a relevant systematic cost-benefit study has
been undertaken, the results, if irrefutable, should be followed, as
the accepted practice standard would clearly seem to dictate. The
kind of analysis contemplated by the validation proposal would,
however, minimally require the following: (1) that the incommensurables be capable of being valued or otherwise quantified with
considerable definiteness;' (2) that the effects of the medical procedure in question be isolated from other potentially causative influences; "6 (3) that the necessary resources be committed to such an
inquiry; (4) that the findings be demonstrated with minimal equivocation; and (5) that the results be disseminated in a timely fashion."5 3 Experience has shown that in reality definitive cost-benefit
studies which form the basis for important decisions are rare. 64 The
existence of surveys that would, or reasonably should,' be outcomedeterminative in a complex malpractice lawsuit would be even less
likely. Indeed, while the cost-benefit or more accurately the "cost161. The problem of quantifying the elements of a cost-benefit calculus is a particularly
complex one in which the imponderables of personal injuries - including death, pain and
suffering, disability, and loss of earning capacity - are elements to be monetized. See generally Bus. WEEK, June 30, 1975, at 114-15.
162. Some of the difficulties in isolating the effects of a particular medical technique
are explored in Dykes, UncriticalThinking in Medicine - The Confusion Between Hypothesis and Knowledge, 227 J.A.M.A. 1275 (1974). Among other factors contributing to this
uncertainty are basic ignorance, the fact that there are few true cures available, biological
variability, and problems in differentiating the placebo effect from a specific pharmacological
or therapeutic effect. Id. at 1276; cf. Benson & Epstein, The Placebo Effect-A Neglected
Asset in the Care of Patients, 232 J.A.M.A. 1225 (1975).
163. It has been estimated that most research ideas in medical science are at least 4
years old (and a few are much older) when they appear in the journals. See Roland &
Kirkpatrick, Time Lapse Between Hypothesis and Publicationin the Medical Sciences, 292
N. ENC. J. MED. 1273, 1275 (1975). Where the collection of data extended over a prolonged
period of time, the concept-to-publication interval would be much longer.
164. In a forum conducted in May 1973, Dr. Philip Handler, while president of the
National Academy of Sciences, commented:
The ground rules for such analyses have not been spelled out, nor am I aware of an
important decision outside the military which has really rested on what might be described as a formal, careful cost- and risk-benefit analysis.
Handler, Introduction to National Academy of Sciences Forum on "How Safe is Safe?" in
Green, The Risk-Benefit Calculus in Safety Determinations, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 791, 794,
at 795 (1975).
165. Professor Posner has noted that "[t]he vogue of cost-benefit analysis has created
inflated notions of the effectiveness of analytical techniques in resolving questions of cost and
demand." R. POSNER, supra note 95, at 323. For a spirited dialogue that examines the roles
of layman and scientist in the formulation of public policy through cost-benefit analyses, see
Green, supra note 163; Handler, A Rebuttal: The Need for a Sufficient Scientific Base for
Government Regulation, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 808 (1975).
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and risk-benefit" '66 analysis is a popular concept, it also has been
described as a facile phrase that does not necessarily refer to a
developed art or science.'67
Situations in which no relevant cost-benefit study exists will
undoubtedly constitute the great majority of cases, and in such
instances the better reasoned course would be to yield to the collective experience of the medical profession. Otherwise, the evaluation
and formulation of medical decisions will be left to the case-by-case
intuition of judge or jury while the development of future costbenefit studies is awaited. Absent a definitive cost-benefit study,
lay judges and jurors would be guided only by the desultory and
fleeting wisdom that a few hired or at least interested experts could
impart in a brief tender of less than unbiased testimony. It is specious to assume that from such a meager foundation a few laymen
can construct all the premises needed to balance the costs and benefits. A court's oversimplified articulation of the medical facts is not
necessarily self-fulfilling. In the Helling case the court's simplistic
and conclusory method, devoid of all but the most superficial appraisals of the medical facts and costs, may ultimately stand as a
monument to judicial paralogism. Furthermore, if practicing physicians are not normally able to organize into entities with a capacity
for systematic cost-benefit research, 1 8 the refusal to recognize their
professional standard would have little positive effect in encouraging basic research.
Not only is the traditional trier of fact inherently less capable
than the medical profession of making optimal choices among competing therapeutic regimens, but without a determinative professional standard, the notorious penchant of plaintiff-oriented juries,
and in recent years judges, to go for the deep pocket' 9 might be
exacerbated. Moreover, when a patient bent produces "hard" medical standards in the form of judicial rulings as a matter of law as in
Helling, allocation of medical resources and courses of therapy
might be obdurately skewed and the achievement of optimal patient
care frustrated.
The uniquely obscure causation questions in malpractice cases
also invite subjective judgments by judge and jury. The presence of
some disease or injury that antedates the actionable event complicates the assignment of responsibility for the patient's ultimate con166.
167.
168.
169.
DUKE L.J.

Handler, supra note 164, at 795.
Id.
See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Morris, supra note 96, at 1165. See generally King, Book Review, 1974
1000, at 1004-05.
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dition. Moreover, since medicine is an inexact science, deciding
whether an injury is the proximate result of substandard care or
merely the realization of an unavoidable risk of therapy is a perplexing task. Without a professional standard for a benchmark, these
added imponderables abet arbitrary judgments in malpractice
cases.
Furthermore, the argument that industry standards may arise
from economically motivated cost-cutting'7 ° appears less compelling
in the medical malpractice setting. There is no indication of this
kind of systemic disregard for the patient's welfare as a means of
cost-cutting in the practice of medicine.' 71 The application of an
accepted rather than customary practice standard, animated by the
general dedication of the profession, should serve further to reduce
the possibility that substandard procedures spawned by indifference or venality might be insulated from liability.
(3) Impact on Professional Discretion
The importance of preserving an unfettered exercise of professional judgment uninhibited by the constant presentiment of an
unsympathetic jury applying an arbitrary standard of care cannot
be overemphasized. No situation is comparable to that found in
medical malpractice, where natural persons are made the primary
defendants in civil litigation with such frequency. Even with a professional standard of care, no other legal milieu is less forgiving of
human error than that in which the health care provider, and especially the physician, must perform.
A professionally determined standard offers a measure of forewarning of the legal effect of one's actions, without which there can
be little predictability,'7 2 uniformity, or repose 173 for the medical

practitioner. Besides inspiring a chronic Angst that pervades and
poisons the professional relationship, uncertainty over the law's
expectations also promotes defensive medicine7 4 with its attendant
social exactions.
170. See W. PRossER, supra note 59, at 167.
171. McCoid, supra note 92, at 609.
172. One commentator noted that without a professional standard of care, the practice
of medicine would be condemned to "blind ignorance of what is right and wrong within the
law," a framework in which no profession can function. Charfoos, supranote 143, at 79.
173. With the widespread adoption of the so-called "discovery rule" for statute of
limitations purposes in medical malpractice cases, not only is the health care provider unsure
of the substantive legal effects of his conduct, but he may not even rely on the usual repose
that the passage of the applicable period of limitations once conferred. See note 87 supra and
authorities cited therein.
174. See note 10 supra.
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Inappropriateness of Malpractice Litigation as a Vehicle for
No-Fault Loss Distribution

When a duly licensed physician acts in strict accordance with
the teaching of and in a manner acceptable to his profession, but
nevertheless may be held liable as a matter of course, a situation
exists that closely approximates liability without fault. Indeed, Justice Utter, concurring in Helling, said precisely that.'75 If such a
characterization is accurate, at least a limited manifestation of nofault is creeping sub rosa into an otherwise fault based system of
liability. That situation promises to bring with it the unacceptable
costs, definitional complications, uneven loss allocation, and class
oriented individualization of benefits found in a formal no-fault
approach.' The added insult also remains of moral reprehension
associated with both the allegation and adjudication of professional
liability under a traditional fault system.
(5)

Fundamental Fairness

Tort litigation under a fault based system is oppressive, and
when defendants are sued in their individual capacities and their
professional competence is questioned sub judice, the procedure is
even more damning. When, as in most cases, allegations address a
failure to exercise rather than to possess the required skill or qualifications, the good reputation of the defendant is not normally at
issue and may not even be admissible.'7 Thus, malpractice cases
appear quite selective in their perception, usually focusing on isolated acts of alleged misfeasance. When a defendant's only wrong
was to adhere faithfully to the course prescribed by his profession,
the criminalizing impact of the litigation seems grossly out of proportion to the quality of the conduct challenged. Perhaps most lamentable of all is the fact that many malpractice cases assume a
ubiquitous presence in the lives of the defendants that often cruelly
haunts them throughout the protracted proceedings. Apart from the
self-recriminating throes of those involved in active litigation, an in
175. Justice Utter stated:
[W]e are, in reality, imposing liability, because, in choosing between an innocent
plaintiff and a doctor, who could have prevented the full effects of this disease by
administering a simple, harmless test and treatment, the plaintiff should not have to
bear the risk of loss. As such, imposition of liability approaches that of strict liability.
Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 520, 519 P.2d 981, 984 (1974) (Utter, J., concurring).
176. See § II supra.
177. See, e.g., Stauffer v. Karabin, 30 Colo. App. 357, 364-65, 492 P.2d 862, 865-66
(1971) (evidence as to defendant's reputation in medical community inadmissible as hearsay); French v. Brodsky, 521 S.W.2d 670, 674 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (testimony as to the good
reputation of the defendant in medical malpractice case not normally admissible).
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terrorem temper also pervades the medical profession generally.
The counter argument, that the professional standard perpetuates the unfair "conspiracy of silence"' 75 of the medical profession,
is not persuasive. Even if the professional standard were not conclusive on the question of due care, it would not necessarily or even
likely follow that expert medical testimony could be dispensed with.
Expert testimony would still be needed in most cases not only to
assist the finder of fact in determining what procedures were feasible, but also to afford guidance in deciding such related matters as
medical causation and the nature and extent of the plaintiffs injuries.
As a general proposition, then, judicial deference to the standards developed by the medical profession seems well advised. Liberal application of the accepted rather than customary variant of
the professional standard should mitigate any harshness in such an
approach by liberating the profession from the normative force of
the habitual. Moreover, the discretion of lay triers of fact would be
preserved, as the following sections illustrate, with respect to matters that they are competent to decide.
D.

PotentialExceptions to the ProfessionalStandard of Care
(1)

The "Common Knowledge" Cases

The requirement of expert testimony 7 ' is deeply ingrained in
medical malpractice law and would, as previously noted, probably
survive the abrogation of the professional standard of care. An important exception to the expert witness requirement, regardless of
the standard of care employed, is the "common knowledge" doctrine, " which allows the finder of fact to rely exclusively on its fund
178. See, e.g., D. HARNEY, supra, note 40, § 5.1; 1 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra
note 87,
14.02-14.03; Belli, An Ancient Therapy Still Applied: The Silent Medical
Treatment, 1 VILL. L. REV. 250 (1956); Kayajanian, Confronting the Conspiracyof Silence:
We Have the Tiger by the Tail, 6 U. WEST L.A.L. REV. 40 (1974); Kelner, The Silent Doctors
-The Conspiracy of Silence, 5 U. RIcH. L. REV. 119 (1970); Seidelson, Medical Malpractice
Cases and the Reluctant Expert, 16 CATH. U.L. REV. 158 (1966); Note, Malpractice and
Medical Testimony, 77 HARV. L. REV. 333 (1963); Note, Overcoming the "Conspiracy of
Silence": Statutory and Commonlaw Innovations, 45 MINN. L. REV. 1019 (1961). The reluctance of members of the medical profession to testify against each other has been duly noted
by the judiciary, especially by such champions of plaintiffs' rights as Justice Tobriner and
the late Justice Musmanno. See, e.g., Clark v. Gibbons, 66 Cal. 2d 399, 416 n.3, 426 P.2d
525, 537 n.3, 58 Cal. Rptr. 125, 137 n.3 (1967) (Tobriner, J., concurring); Demchuk v. Bralow,
404 Pa. 100, 107, 170 A.2d 868, 872 (1961) (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
179. See Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 515 (1971) (hospitals); Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 597 (1962)
(physicians).
180. See Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 141-42, 167 A.2d 625, 632 (1961).
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of common knowledge to assay the feasibility of alternate courses
of action and to evoke the appropriate standard of care.'81 Because
the issue of negligence in that context is not related to technical
matters peculiarly within the knowledge of the medical profession,
there is no need for expert testimony on the question of the standard
of care.
The common knowledge principle finds its widest application
in conjunction with the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which is based
upon an assumption that the negligence may be circumstantially
inferred from the nature of the resulting injury. 82' In those res ipsa
cases in which an inference of negligence may be drawn by laymen, 8 3 the standard of care is essentially the same as in the common
knowledge cases. Only the quality of the proof is differentcircumstantial evidence in the former and direct evidence of negligence in the latter.
The common knowledge cases, most of which seem to be of the
res ipsa variant, typically have involved fairly perspicuous fact situations, such as the failure to remove a sponge or other foreign objects
from the site of an incision,'84 injuries to portions of the body outside
of the surgical field,18 or whether a post-operative patient's acute
condition required notification of patient's attending physician. 6 In
recent years a tendency has developed to enlarge the scope of the
common knowledge exception to reach ever more complex factual
situations. Thus, expert testimony on the standard of care was not
required when a patient's ureter allegedly was severed during a
hysterectomy even though the operation was complicated, requiring
181. Id.
182. See generally W. PROSSER, supranote 59, § 39.
183. See 1 D. LoUIsELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 87, 9 14.06, at 439-41, cataloging the
more common examples; 2 S. SPEISER, THE NEGLIGENCE CASE: RES IPSA LOQUITUR § 24.8 (1972).
A number of cases have permitted a plaintiff to rely on res ipsa loquitur where an
inference of negligence could be supported by expert medical testimony, in other words
permitting an inference or presumption that such results do not normally occur absent a
failure to follow the appropriate course of therapy. See 1 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra,
14.06, at 438-39, 192-94 (Supp. 1974); 2 S. SPEISER, supra, 24.8, at 216 (1972). In such
cases the professional standard of care should be as controlling as it would be in a straight
negligence action in which the outcome depends on a professional standard.
184. See, e.g., Hestbeck v. Hennepin County, 297 Minn. 419, 212 N.W.2d 361 (1973)
(expert testimony not required under a res ipsa claim when surgical sponge was allegedly lost
during gallbladder surgery); cf. Lipman v. Lustig, 346 Mass. 182, 190 N.E.2d 675 (1963)
(expert testimony not necessary and directed verdict for defendant improper where dentist
allegedly permitted reamer to fall down patient's throat).
185. See, e.g., Wiles v. Myerly, 210 N.W.2d 619 (Iowa 1973) (bums discovered on
patient's buttocks following vascular surgery involving another part of patient's body).
186. See, e.g., Karrigan v. Nazareth Convent & Academy, Inc., 212 Kan. 44, 510 P.2d
190 (1973).
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surgical invasion of the area near the ureter.187
The apparent straightforwardness of the common knowledge
cases is belied when a defendant responds to an allegation of negligence based on a purported common knowledge standard by introducing evidence of compliance with the professional standard of
care. Although such a response has been infrequent in the past, the
possibilities for collision between plaintiff's reliance upon the common knowledge doctrine and defendant's reliance upon conformity
to an accepted professional practice should multiply as the catalogue of common knowledge situations keeps pace with growing
public comprehension of medical matters.
Perhaps the most prevalent common knowledge cases have involved foreign objects left inside the patient, sometimes referred to
generically as the "sponge" cases. 8 ' Legal theories employed to support liability based upon defendant's actual, as opposed to imputed,
negligence have run the gamut, including straight negligence, res
ipsa loquitur, negligence per se, and nondelegable duty theories. 9
This variousness attests to the doctrinal uncertainty with which the
courts have dealt in such cases generally. When the jury's common
knowledge sense of the standard of care is contradicted by evidence
of compliance with a professionally recognized practice, this uncertainty is compounded. The results in such cases have been ambiguous and, especially in the older cases, divided.' 8 The drift of authority ostensibly has been to reject the conclusiveness of at least the
customary practice variation of the professional standard in these
foreign object cases."8 ' Reportedly, the foreign object cases have
been the only ones in which a few courts have even considered the
inference of negligence nonrebuttable."'9
Upon closer scrutiny, the conflict in cases in which the common
knowledge standard appears to run counter to the professional stan187. See Pry v. Jones, 253 Ark. 534, 487 S.W.2d 606 (1973).
188. McCoid, supra note 92, at 610.
189. See cases cited in Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 9 (1966, Supp. 1974); Annot., 65 A.L.R. 1023
(1930).
190. See McCoid, supra note 92, at 611-14.
191. Id. For examples of cases rejecting the customary practice where a foreign object
has been left in a wound, see Leonard v. Watsonville Community Hosp., 47 Cal. 2d 509, 305
P.2d 36 (1957); Grant v. Touro Infirmary, 254 La. 204, 223 So. 2d 148 (1969). See generally
10 A.L.R.3d 9, § 3(d) (1966, Supp. 1974). Other courts have appeared more sympathetic to
the professional standard in such cases. See Dietze v. King, 184 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Va. 1960)
(holding that in the absence of expert proof that sponge count was the customary practice,
failure to make sponge count did not establish negligence); cf. Hestbeck v. Hennepin County,
297 Minn. 419, 212 N.W.2d 361 (1973) (implying that had conclusive evidence of compliance
with the professional standard been forthcoming, the inference of negligence might have been

rebutted).
192.

See 1 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 87, $ 14.07, at 441-42.
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dard is often more apparent than real. In those situations, the following four observations may facilitate analysis. First, careful examination of the record may reveal that in fact no conflict exists.
On the one hand, technical matters may fairly make the case unsuitable for lay evaluation. Conversely, the medical procedures involved may have been so readily cognizable that no recognized professional practice ever formally crystallized, or the court may have
been unable to determine what the applicable professional practice
93
was. 1
Secondly, the court's adherence to a common knowledge"leave it to the jury"-approach in the sponge cases may simply
signify underlying judicial incredulity.'9 4 Since the probability of
losing a sponge, for example, is exceedingly remote if an approved
technique is followed,'95 the presence of a sponge in the patient following surgery may permit a jury to conclude that the accepted
practice was not as defendant asserted or was not followed, despite
evidence to the contrary. 98' In such cases, however, a court probably would be on sounder analytical footing by stating the issue in
terms of the persuasiveness of opposing testimony and evidence
rather than impliedly rejecting the professional standard of care.
Thirdly, most cases based on the loss of foreign objects or injuries to remote portions of the body usually involve an unconscious
or temporarily incapacitated patient. In these cases the courts have
tended to base liability upon the special responsibility owed to patients, 9 ' as well as upon defendant's inability or unwillingness to
193. See Chappetta v. Ciaravella, 311 So. 2d 563 (La. App. 1975). In Chappetta a
laparotomy pad had been left inside patient following a hysterectomy. In upholding liability,
the court took great pains to state a caveat as to the effect of compliance with the customary
practice in such cases. The court circumvented this issue because it was unable to ascertain
what the applicable professional standard was. A number of Louisiana cases have purportedly
rejected the conclusiveness of the customary practice standard in certain cases. See Grant v.
Touro Infirmary, 254 La. 204, 223 So. 2d 148 (1969) (sponge left in incision was negligence
per se notwithstanding compliance with the customary practice); Favalora v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 144 So. 2d 544 (La. App. 1962) (rejected customary practice relating to precautions
to be taken to prevent patients from falling during X-ray examinations). More recent Louisiana decisions, however, have suggested the continuing validity of the professional standard
for many cases. See, e.g., Chapman v. Argonaut-Southwest Ins. Co., 290 So. 2d 779, 786 (La.
App. 1974); note 135 supra.
194. See Morris, supra note 96, at 1166-67.
195. Id. at 1166.
196. See Burke v. Washington Hosp. Center, 475 F.2d.364, 365-66 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (jury
was free to disbelieve defendant's version of events, thus preserving the inference from res
ipsa); cf. Hiatt v. Groce, 215 Kan. 14, 22, 523 P.2d 320, 326 (1974) (jury might not be bound
by expert's conclusions that defendant had complied with professional standard if those
conclusions were based upon records that the jury might have been persuaded were erroneous).
197. See W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 39, at 223.
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explain or account for plaintiffs injury. Therefore, such cases are
probably sui generis.'"
Finally, the unwillingness of some courts to adhere to a relevant
professionally determined standard in an apparent common knowledge situation may denote an adverse judicial reaction to the fact
that the professional standard relied upon by defendant was bottomed on the customary rather than the professionally accepted
practice. Adoption of the more flexible accepted practice criterion
would probably reduce those occasions in which the common knowledge and professional standards diverge and also would make the
courts less hesitant to adhere to the professionally determined
norms in purported common knowledge cases.
When one of the foregoing considerations does not control, and
when defendant's conformity to a relevant accepted practice of the
profession has been satisfactorily demonstrated, the more judicious
view would seem normally to dictate deference to the professional
standard. This conclusion is consonant with the arguments favoring
a professional standard of care generally and reflects the preferability of the collective judgment of the medical profession over the ad
hoc and ill-informed supposition of lay jurors or a judge in medical
matters, even ones that appear elementary to the technically naive
observer.
(2)

Standard of Disclosure for "Informed Consent" Cases

The debate over the weight to be accorded the professional
standard has carried over into the doctrine of "informed consent."' 99
This doctrine derives from the basic notion that "[e]very human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
198. See generally Anderson v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1 (1975); Thode, supra
note 21.
199. The doctrine of informed consent is a relatively recent development in the law of
medical malpractice. Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, modified, 187 Kan.
186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960), is commonly recognized as the bellwether case that presaged general
acceptance of the doctrine. The theory has spawned a considerable literature. See, e.g.,
Alsobrook, Informed Consent: A Right to Know, 40 INs. COUNSEL J. 580 (1973); Capron, supra
note 79; Karchmer, Informed Consent: A Plaintiff's Medical Malpractice "Wonder Drug,"
31 MD. L. REv. 29 (1966); Kessenick & Mankin, Medical Malpractice: The Right to Be
Informed, 8 U.S.F.L. REV. 261 (1973); Plante, An Analysis of "Informed Consent," 36
FORDHAM L. REV. 639 (1968); Ritts, A Physician's View of Informed Consent in Human
Experimentation, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 631 (1968); Shartsis, Informed Consent: Some Problems Revisited, 51 NEB. L. REV. 527 (1972); Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to
Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 628 (1969); Note, Informed Consent-A Proposed Standardfor
Medical Disclosure, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 548 (1974); Note, supra note 80; Note, Restructuring
Informed Consent: Legal Therapy for the Doctor-PatientRelationship, 79 YALE L.J. 1533
(1970).
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shall be done with his body .... ,,201
Before he undergoes treatment, the patient first should have received information regarding
the risks of and alternatives to the contemplated procedures and the
prognoses if he goes untreated, 2 ' and then the patient's consent

must be obtained.
A central issue in the informed consent cases relates to the
nature of the physician's duty to disclose. While the matter is sometimes bifurcated analytically into questions of the existence of a
duty and its scope, 2 2 for present purposes both will be referred to

in terms of a single standard of disclosure. Until recently, the courts
treated the standard of disclosure in the informed consent cases
much the same as they did the standard of care in cases involving
negligent malpractice. It generally was held that the extent of a
physician's duty to disclose is determined by the professional standard for other similarly situated members of the profession. 23 Then,
in 1972 the landmark case of Canterbury v. Spence214 was decided
by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Though it was
not the first decision to reject the conclusiveness of the professional
standard in informed consent cases, 25 Canterbury has commonly
been regarded as the leading exponent of that trend.20 The court
expressly rejected the view "that the physician's obligation to disclose is either germinated or limited by medical practice." ' 7 The
court based its holding on four grounds. First, it observed that there
was serious doubt that any discernible custom existed reflecting a
professional consensus on the appropriate scope of disclosure. 28 Secondly, the court argued that to bind the disclosure to medical usage
would be to arrogate the decision on revelation to the physician, in
possible derogation of the patient's right of self-determination. 9
Thirdly, the court noted that the decision as to what should be
disclosed oftentimes represents a nonmedical judgment. ' And fi200. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914)
(Cardozo, J.).
201. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
202. See id.
203. See Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 199, at 636.
204. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.) (Robinson, J.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
205. See, e.g., Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa. Super. 260, 286 A.2d 647 (1971) (duty to
disclose what a reasonable person in plaintiff's apparent position would consider material to
his decision to undergo treatment).
206. E.g., Gough, Recent Uses and Misues of the Informed Consent Doctrine, 10 THE
FORUM 383, 389 (1974).
207. 464 F.2d at 783.
208. Id. at 783.
209. Id. at 784.
210. Id. at 785.
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nally, the court rejected the view that the prevailing medical practice should define the standard of care for physicians generally.,
The court proceeded to adopt a test that would require disclosure
when a reasonable person in patient's apparent position would
212
likely attach significance to the risk in question.
While the professional standard of disclosure is still often referred to as the "majority rule ' 2 1 in informed consent cases and has
been reaffirmed in a number of recent opinions,21 4 it has been vigorously challenged by other courts that have taken the Canterbury
type approach to a varying extent. 215 It seems that more courts
have specifically addressed the question of the weight to be accorded the profession's standards in the informed consent context
than in the more frequent negligent treatment cases. This emphasis
appears well deserved. The appropriate standard of disclosure is
probably an even more inextricable issue in these cases than its
counterpart is in the treatment cases. In addition to the usual arguments favoring abolition of the professional standard, especially the
customary practice formulation, in malpractice cases generally,
additional considerations arise that may be especially pertinent in
informed consent cases. One such argument-that the nonexistence
of a demonstrable custom for disclosure reflects a professional consensus-is not convincing. The absence of a medical consensus
alone should not be dispositive when the customary practice formulation is replaced by the accepted practice construct. Under the
latter, the absence of a clear consensus on the professional custom
or usage should not prevent medical experts from deciding whether
the challenged conduct falls within the broad ambit of what is commonly perceived to be sound medical practice.
The crucial argument for rejection of the professional standard
211.
212.
213.

Id. (semble; prevailing practice may be evidence in negligent treatment cases).
See id. at 787; Waltz & Scheuneman, supranote 199, at 640.
E.g., Butler v. Berkeley, 25 N.C. App. 325, 213 S.E.2d 571, 582 (1975); see D.
HARNEY, supra note 40, § 24(A), at 61-62; Note, Informed Consent-A ProposedStandardfor
Medical Disclosure, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 548, 551-52 (1973); Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d 1084, 1088
(1973).
214. See, e.g., Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1974) (Texas law); Nishi v.
Hartwell, 52 Hawaii 188, 473 P.2d 116 (1970); Charley v. Cameron, 215 Kan. 750, 528 P.2d
1205 (1974); Butler v. Berkeley, 25 N.C. App. 325, 213 S.E.2d 571 (1975); Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d
1084, 1091-92 (1973). Several decisions have adopted somewhat of a compromise position
whereby the professional standard is still controlling, but once nondisclosure has been shown,
the burden of showing compliance with the professional practice is placed on the defendant.
See Stauffer v. Karabin, 30 Colo. App. 357, 492 P.2d 862 (1971).
215. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972);
Holland v. Sisters of St. Joseph, 522 P.2d 208 (Ore. 1974); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606,
295 A.2d 676 (1972); Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wash. App. 272, 522 P.2d 852 (1974), aff'd, 85
Wash. 2d 151, 530 P.2d 334 (1975).

1264

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

of disclosure in informed consent cases is based on the underlying
objective of the doctrine. While the informed consent concept appears to have a number of functions," 6 foremost among them is the
vindication of the patient's right of self-determination. 21 7 The pa-

tient's freedom to decide what shall be done with his person may
be an even more paramount interest than the preservation of the
patient's health. If the patient is the party vested with this near
absolute veto power over medical intervention, it inevitably follows
that the standard of disclosure must be dictated by the patient's
informational needs as nearly as they can be perceived by the physician.2 18 What information would apparently be significant to the

patient is a decision that a layman normally is competent to make.
In more doctrinal terms, once the existence of the risks and alternatives of the proposed therapy as well as other relevant medical facts
are confirmed by medical experts, 29 the question of what risks and

information would have been material to a person in the apparent
position of the patient is a classic instance of a common knowledge
situation. Under a rough division of labor, the physician is charged
with preserving the patient's health, but not until the patient first
has made the threshold decision of whether to proceed with the
contemplated therapy. The standard of care should reflect this allocation of decision-making responsibilities.
Appealing arguments surely may be raised against the
Canterbury solution. Under a Canterbury type analysis, a physician
normally cannot rely with certainty upon his professional judgment
or upon procedures approved by the profession. Moreover, the physician may be held liable even though the treatment itself was flawless by any reasonable standard because the essence of the informed
consent theory is not the discovery of negligently inflicted injury,
but the materialization of calculated risks about which the patient
should have been forewarned. 220 Sending the adequacy-of-the-

disclosure issue to the jury, therefore, places the doctor in the utmost jeopardy unless he has a meaningful premonition of what dis216. Professor Capron has summarized the functions served by the informed consent
doctrine to include the promotion of individual autonomy, the protection of the patient's

status as a human being, the avoidance of fraud and duress, the encouragement of selfscrutiny by the physician, the fostering of rational decision making, and the involvement of
the public in medical matters. Capron, supra note 79, at 364-76.
217. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972).
218. See id. at 786-87.
219. The identification of the risks would have to be made by medical experts in most
cases. This requirement for expert testimony would survive the adoption of the Canterbury
standard of disclosure. See id. at 791-92.
220. See generally Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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closure will be legally sufficient.
Although it is a close question, on balance Canterburyprobably
expresses the more cogent approach for informed consent cases. To
allow the medical profession to set the standard for disclosure may
well disenfranchise patients with respect to a decision of paramount
importance to them and one that lay patients normally are quite
competent to make. The seeming incongruity of retaining the professional standard of care for treatment on the one hand, while
rejecting the professional standard for disclosure on the other, is
perhaps best explained by viewing the informed consent doctrine as
a corollary to the common knowledge exception to the general requirement for expert testimony to determine the standard of care.
The apparent harshness of this view may be ameliorated by recognizing certain justifications for nondisclosure. For example, when
disclosure might seriously threaten the health of the patient, the
withholding of the information from the patient should be excused.
In these cases the emphasis shifts from the patient's interest in selfdetermination to the goal of averting serious injury. Under such
circumstances, the judgment of the medical profession normally
should be determinative in setting the standard for testing the medical justification for such nondisclosure."'
221. With respect to the therapeutic privilege to withhold information, some commentators have rejected the customary practice standard as unworkable for appraisals of the
psychological state of the patient. See Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 199, at 642-43. These
same writers, however, have recommended that the physician be permitted to establish the
"medical propriety of his decision," and that the relevant test be whether his acts
corresponded with "sound medical judgment." Id. at 642-43; cf. Smith, TherapeuticPrivilege
to Withhold Specific DiagnosisFrom Patient Sick With Serious orFatalIllness, 19 TENN. L.
REV. 349, 357 (1946). That test would appear consistent with the accepted practice formulation broadly construed, which would of course represent a professionally developed standard.
There has been fear expressed that unless the therapeutic privilege to withhold information is carefully circumscribed it may devour the disclosure rule itself. Canterbury v. Spence,
464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). This has led some to question
the wisdom of the Waltz & Scheuneman formulation. See Capron, supra note 79, at 412-13
n.76. Others have been so perplexed by the question that they appear to have adopted both
the professional and reasonable man standards coincidentally. See Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d
229, 246, 502 P.2d 1, 12, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 516 (1972) (holding that a disclosure need not be
made beyond that required by the "medical community" when doctor can prove that the facts
relied upon would demonstrate to a "reasonable man" that patient would have been so upset
he could not have dispassidnately weighed the risks). Still others have suggested that the goal
should be one of "tactful disclosure" even if it proves distressing to the patient. Note, supra
note 80, at 1655. Notwithstanding such criticism, considering the dilemma facing the physician, retention of the therapeutic privilege as tested by a professional standard would appear
the best solution. If the burden of justifying the nondisclosure were placed upon the physician, as it probably should be, the jury would presumably be free to some extent to disregard
expert testimony offered by defendant that lacked credibility or was otherwise unworthy of
belief. This should afford an ample measure of protection to the patient without abandoning
altogether the physician's therapeutic privilege.
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E. ProfessionalStandards Review Organizationsand the
Standard of Care
In 1972 Congress enacted the Professional Standard Review
Organization [PSRO] Amendment22 2 to the Social Security Act. 23
Not only does this legislation augur basic changes in the delivery of
medical care and in the physician-patient relationship, 24 it also

may affect the legal rules governing the standard of care for medical
professionals. Inconsiderable if not cursory congressional attention
to the PSRO Amendment 25 has produced a rough, obscure statute,
even considering that it essentially is enabling legislation. Nor has
sufficient time elapsed since enactment for meaningful case law to
have developed. Therefore, the examination of this legislation must
be tentative and the conclusions reached speculative at best.228
According to its stated purpose, the PSRO Amendment was
designed to promote effective, efficient, and economical delivery of
health care of proper quality 227 for patients under federally sup-

ported Medicare, Medicaid, and Maternal and Child Health Care
programs. Its primary aim apparently was to reduce the spiraling
costs for unnecessary medical services. The impetus behind these
unnecessary services stemmed in part from the practice of defensive
medicine, 28 undisciplined medical practices generally, and a desire

to accommodate patient expectations regardless of necessity or
costs. 229 Another possible contributing factor may have been the
phenomenon that one writer in a somewhat different context has
222. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c (Supp. II, 1972). See generally McMahon, PSROs. . . Implications for Hospitals, 48 HosPrrALS, Jan. 1, 1974, at 53; Welch, PSROs-Prosand Cons, 290 N.
ENG. J. MED. 1319 (1974); Note, Professional StandardsReview and the Limitation of Health
Services: An Interpretation of the Effect of Statutory Immunity on Medical Malpractice
Liability, 54 B.U.L. REV. 931 (1974); Note, Federally Imposed Self-Regulation of Medical
Practice:A Critique of the Professional StandardsReview Organization,42 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 822 (1974); Note, PSRO: Malpractice Liability and the Impact of the Civil Immunity
Clause, 62 GEO. L.J. 1499 (1974); Note, PSRO: A Status Report on Medical Peer Review
Under the 1972 Social Security Act Amendments, 6 LoYoLA (CHicAGO) U.L.J. 90 (1974).
223. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1396(i) (1970).
224. See Note, LOYOLA U.L.J., supra note 222, at 102-03 & nn.108-13.
225. Apparently the PSRO legislation reached the Senate from committee as part of a
989-page Social Security Act. Thus dwarfed, it gained relatively little attention. From the
Senate it passed through a House-Senate Conference Committee, reaching the House on the
final day of the 92d Congress, and passed without further amendment and with only one
dissenting vote. See Segal, A Hard Look at the PSRO Law, 2 J.L. MED., Sept.-Oct., 1974, at
26; Note, GEo. WASH. L. REv., supra note 221, at 824 n.5.
226. For general background on the legislation, see S. REP. No. 1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
267 (1972).
227. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c (Supp. II, 1972).
228. See note 10 supra.
229. See Note, GEO. WASH. L. REV., supra note 222, at 838.
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or the "love of doing a thing' ' 31-

practicing medicine-which is inherently self-perpetuating.
The legislation contemplates the establishment of area PSRO's
throughout the nation. Certain norms are to be established and
applied in the evaluation of the quality and necessity of health
services. In addition to specific sanctions for noncompliance with
the statute, 2 the Amendment also provides for civil immunity for
certain conduct in conformity with applicable PSRO norms.3 3 Two
general questions concerning the immunity provision immediately
arise. First, how does the proffered grant of immunity affect traditional standard of care principles? Secondly, what is the likely reach
of the immunity provision? These questions are considered in turn
below.
(1)

PSRO Norms and the Standard of Care

The PSRO norms are to be professionally developed standards.
Rather than relying on the customary practice, the statutory language may imply a more flexible standard that is more akin to an
accepted practice model.24 The statute states that the purpose of
the review of medical services is to determine whether they are or
were "medically necessary ' 23 5 and meet "professionally recognized
standards,12 3 and in the case of hospitalizations whether outpatient care or care at a different type of institution might be employed in lieu of contemplated in-patient care "consistent with the
provision of appropriate medical care."' 7 The PSRO norms are to
include a range of appropriate diagnosis and treatment for specific
conditions consistent with "professionally recognized and accepted
230. This term was attributed to Konrad Lorenz in Crile, The Surgeon's Dilemma,
HARPERS, May 1975, at 38.
231. Id. George Crile used the Funktionlustphenomenon to help explain the eagerness
(even apart from economic incentives) of a surgeon to ply his trade.
232. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-7, -9(b)(1), (3) (Supp. II, 1972).
233. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-16(c) (Supp. II, 1972).
234. See notes 98-121 supra and accompanying text.
235. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-4(a)(1)(A) (Supp. II, 1972). Similarly, health care practitioners
and providers are obliged under the statute to assure that services ordered or provided by
them are medically necessary. Id. § 1320c-9(a)(1)(A), (D).
236. Id. § 1320c-4(a)(1)(B). The provider or practitioner is likewise required to see that
the services meet the "professionally recognized standards of health care." Id. § 1320c9(a)(1)(B), (E).
237. Id. § 1320c-4(a)(1)(C). Health care practitioners and providers are also to assure
that inpatient care, consistent with "professionally recognized health care standards," is both
medically necessary and would not be available on a more economic basis at a facility of a
different type. Id. § 1320c-9(a)(2)(A), (B).
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patterns of care." 3 ' The foregoing language seems to suggest that
the emphasis will be on what the profession perceives to be acceptable practice rather than merely what the medical custom has been.
This conclusion is undermined somewhat by the requirement that
the PSRO norms be derived from "typical patterns of practice in
its regions. ' '121 Hopefully, the PSRO norms will reflect the latest
state of the art in the profession and will not simply mimic professional custom.
Regardless of whether the norms are based upon the customary
or the more liberal accepted practice construct, it seems that Congress has opted for a standard set by the medical profession by
passing the PSRO Amendment. The legislation may thus represent
at least a partial repudiation of decisions like Helling v. Carey24 and
the judicial arrogation of medical decision-making that the case
represents.
Another question relates to the appropriate geographic frame of
reference from which the PSRO norms are to be derived. The primary reviewing unit in the administrative hierarchy is the "area"
PSRO, 24 1 supplemented by Statewide Professional Standards Review Councils established for states with three or more area
PSRO's2 4 2 and a National Council. 2 3 The Statewide Council appears
to be envisioned essentially as a coordinating agency with little
direct responsibility for review or formation of norms." The statute
is ambiguous on the crucial question of the input the area and
national organizations are to have in the creation of the norms. It
says that the National Council shall provide for the preparation and
distribution of materials indicating the "regional norms"' 5 to be
used by the PSRO's as "a principal point of evaluation and review.' '24 Each PSRO is to "apply professionally developed norms of
care, diagnosis, and treatment based upon typical patterns of practice in its regions.12 7 When the "actual norms" in a PSRO area are
238. Id. § 1320c-5(b)(1).
239. Id. § 1320c-5(a); cf. Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Weinberger, 395
F. Supp. 125, 139 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
240. 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974). See notes 136-78 supra and accompanying
text.
241. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-4(a) (Supp. II, 1972); S. RE., supra note 226, at 262.
242. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-11(a) (Supp. 11, 1972).
243. See id. § 1320c-12.
244. See id. § 1320c-11(c).
245. Id. § 1320c-5(c)(1).
246. Id. § 1320c-5(c)(2).
247. Id. § 1320c-5(a). The PSRO PROGRAM MANUAL, ch. II, at 31 (1974), alludes to ten
specific multi-state regions. The language of the statute, however, is confusing on this point.
In one place, it refers to an area PSRO applying the norms of "its regions." 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-
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significantly different from the regional norms, the area PSRO shall
be informed by the National Council, and if the PSRO can demonstrate a reasonable basis for the difference, it may be permitted by
the National Council to apply its own area-wide norms. 24 8 From the
foregoing provisions, at least a potential apparently exists for significant or even paramount involvement by the National Council in
the creation of PSRO norms. 9
The question of local responsibility for creation and application
of the norms is further complicated by the area designations of the
Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare [HEW]. Roughly thirtyone states (including some territories, commonwealths, or combinations thereof) have been designated single PSRO areas. 5 Other
states, such as California, boast as many as twenty-eight PSRO
areas.2sl The guidelines for area designations state inter alia that
generally PSRO areas should not cross state lines 252 and, when
possible, should not divide a county.2ss They further state that an
area should as far as possible coincide with the appropriate "medi' '254
cal service area.
It is difficult to predict what the geographical source of the
PSRO norms ultimately will be. If the National Council is aggressive in its development of regional norms and sparing in its approval
of area variances, the norms likely will mirror recent common law
trends away from a locality perspective and in the direction of a
national frame of reference. If the primary responsibility for the
5(a) (Supp. II, 1972). This seems to imply that the one area PSRO might contain multiple
regions, whereas the converse appears to be the intended construction-regions should contain multiple area PSRO's.
248. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(a) (Supp. II, 1972).
249. The statute seems to suggest significant national input and perhaps direct control
over area norms by the National Council. See id. This is clouded somewhat by the HEW
manual, which appears to recognize the possibility that local PSRO Committees might select
their own norms as an alternative to using the "sample sets" provided by the National
Council. See PSRO PROGRAM MANUAL, ch. VII, at 17 (1974). This administrative gloss will
no doubt further confuse the issue.
250. See 42 C.F.R. 99 101.3 - .56 (1974). In such cases, a single PSRO area encompasses
at least one complete state, territory, or commonwealth or combination thereof.
251. See id. § 101.7.
252. Id. § 101.2(a).
253. Id. § 101.2(b).
254. Id. § 101.2(d). This guideline is similar to an intermediate ground chosen in some
cases that repudiated the traditional locality rules. Thus, in Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72
Wash. 2d 73, 79, 431 P.2d 973, 978 (1967), the court noted that the standard of care was "that
established in an area coextensive with the medical and professional means available in those
centers that are readily accessible for appropriate treatment of the patient." For more recent
trends in Washington toward a national or in some cases reasonable person standard in
malpractice, see respectively, Sanderson v. Moline, 7 Wash. App. 439, 499 P.2d 1281 (1972);
and Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974).
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development of the norms devolves to the area PSRO's, by the
default or choice of the National Council or otherwise, a much different situation may result. When the PSRO area coincides with the
state, responsibility for developing the norms would correspond with
state responsibilities for licensing, regulation, and supervision of
health care generally, but may still conflict with common law standards in states following the polar approaches of either a national
or a community standard. On the other hand, the Balkanization
of a single state into numerous PSRO areas that would be empowered to formulate PSRO norms may reanimate the strict locality
rules with their accompanying vices and might conflict with some
states' common law rules adhering to national standards.
Regardless of whether the PSRO norms are based on national,
regional, or one of the manifold area-wide frames of reference, only
by sheer coincidence would otherwise applicable common law rules
governing malpractice correspond with the PSRO geographic orientation. Thus, to the extent its provisions displace the common law
standards, the PSRO Amendment may have precipitously inaugurated dual or even multi-law rules, potentially affecting malpractice
claims within a single state. Such a development should inspire
interesting constitutional queries that, along with other questions,
ultimately may affect the survival of the PSRO legislation.255 The
imponderables of the PSRO standards added to the vagaries that
have historically perplexed the common law standard of care may
prove too much for the medical profession and sorely test the courts'
adaptability. Perhaps the ultimate solution will come in the form
of a unanimous acceptance of national standards regardless of where
the treatment was administered. Certainly that is the incipient
trend of the case law and seems at least to be consistent with the
arguably broad powers conferred on the National Council by the
PSRO Amendment.
(2) Reach of the Immunity Provision
The immunity provision of the PSRO Amendment256 applies in
255. Compare Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp.
125 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (upholding the constitutionality, facially, of the PSRO Amendments as
against challenges under the first, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments to the Constitution),
with American Med. Ass'n v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 515 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (granting preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of HEW regulations that condition Medicare and
Medicaid reimbursement on the establishment by hospitals of "utilization review" committees to assess medical necessity within a certain time frame following patient's admission).
See generally Note, GEO. L.J., supra note 222, at 1509-13; Note, LOYOLA U.L.J., supra note
222, at 102-06; N.Y. Times, May 28, 1975, at 24, col. 1.
256. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-16(c) (Supp. II, 1972).
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appropriate circumstances to patient care financed by Medicare,
Medicaid, or Maternal and Child Health Care programs. Thus, the
potential applicability of the immunity clause is limited to less than
one-half of all health care services provided in the United States. I
Apart from the distinction between federally funded health services
and those financed in other ways, the reach of the immunity provision is not clear. As will be seen, it is difficult to forecast which
health care services that are subject to the PSRO Amendment generally may fall also within the immunity clause.
The PSRO legislation was designed primarily as a means of
reducing unnecessary government-sponsored health care services.
Thus, one would expect the main PSRO emphasis to be upon facets
of patient care that offer the most promise in terms of maximizing
medical resource conservation. This tendency may, at least for a
time, retard the applicability of the immunity clause.
Matters involving professional discretion and judgment as well
as many complex, nonroutine medical procedures may not be amenable to the kind of explicit classification contemplated for PSRO
norms. Bureaucratic delays in the creation and revision of PSRO
norms also would render them incompatible with medical procedures based upon an especially fluid state of technology. Therefore,
even if the necessary human and material resources are committed
to the creation of PSRO norms, which is by no means assured, the
practice of medicine by its very nature would seem to deny the
feasibility of specific PSRO norms for many medical practices and
thus deny potential immunity from civil liability.
The wording of the immunity clause25 raises a number of questions. It conditions immunity on, inter alia, compliance with professionally developed "norms" of care. According to the statute, the
norms are to be utilized as a "principal point of evaluation and
257. See, e.g., Friedman, Leonard Woodcock's Free Lunch, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 21, 1975,
at 84 (estimating that government spending accounted for 40% of all expenditures for health
care). The prospects that PSRO norms will be extended to cover a greater portion of health
care services appear especially good if a national health insurance plan is enacted. See Note,
B.U.L. REV., supra note 222, at 932 n.4.
258. The immunity provision states in part:
No doctor of medicine or osteopathy and no provider . . . of health care services shall
be civilly liable .. .on account of any action taken by him in compliance with or
reliance upon professionally developed norms of care and treatment applied by a
[PSRO] . ..operating in the area where such doctor of medicine or osteopathy or
provider took such action but only if(2) he exercised due care in all professional conduct taken or directed by him and
reasonably related to, and resulting from, the actions taken in compliance with or reliance upon such professionally accepted norms of care and treatment.
42 U.S.C. § 1320c-16(c) (Supp. I, 1972).
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' The term "norms," therefore, probably should encomreview."259
pass all standardized criteria upon which PSRO review is to be

based. 21 Confusion arises from Department of HEW recognition of

three measures to assist in the objective evaluation of health care.
2' 1
These include not only "norms," but "standards" and "criteria"
as well. Since the Department of HEW states that all three of the
foregoing yardsticks are to be used in PSRO review,22 probably they
all ultimately will be construed as falling within the purview of
"norms" as the term is used in the immunity clause. Nevertheless,
the potential difference in the meaning accorded "norms" under the
statute and by the agency, until clarified, will probably engender
some confusion.
Commentators have disagreed on whether actual PSRO approval of a defendant's conduct or merely the defendant's compliance with the prescribed norms is required for immunity. The immunity clause states in part that no doctor or provider of health care
shall be civilly liable for action taken in compliance with or in
reliance upon norms "applied" 2 3 by PSRO's. Relying on this and
other language, one writer has suggested that mere compliance with
the PSRO norms will not insulate the physician from liability unless
the physician also sought and was refused approval of the treatment
that patient now alleges should have been administered. 24 Another

commentator has assumed that a grant of immunity does not require review of the facts of the specific case by the PSRO .285 This
argument seems to consider the objective of the immunity clause to
be the encouragement of compliance with the PSRO norms by the
259. Id. § 1320c-5(c)(2).
260. The Senate Report seems to support this broad construction by substituting "recommendations" for "norms" in its description of the immunity clause. See S. REP., supra note
226, at 267. It also identifies the purpose of the immunity provision as encouraging compliance with "standards and norms." Id. (emphasis added).
261. "Norms" are defined as "numerical or statistical measures of usual observed
performance." PSRO PROGRAM MANUAL, ch. VII, at 16 (1974). "Standards" are "profession-

ally developed expressions of the range of acceptable variation from a norm or criterion," and
"criteria" are professionally developed "predetermined elements against which aspects of the
quality of a medical service may be compared." Id.
262. See PSRO PROGRAM MANUAL, ch. VII, at 2 (1974).
263. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-16(c) (Supp. II, 1972).
264. See Note, B.U.L. REV., supra Note 222, at 936-38. This commentator also suggested, inter alia, that blind compliance with the norms without seeking a variance when the
patient's welfare so warranted would be inconsistent with one of the legislative purposes that of providing medical services of acceptable quality. See id. at 937, n.48, relying on 42
U.S.C. § 1320c (Supp. 11, 1972).
265. See Note, GEO. WASH. L. REv., supra note 222, at 820-30, 837-38. This construction
of the statute seems to have at least tacit support in Senate Report No. 1230. It speaks in
terms of compliance with norms without apparently mentioning a requirement of express
PSRO approval of the action taken. See S. REP., supra note 226, at 267.
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promise of immunity in advance. 6 ' It is well established that legislation which operates in derogation of the common law, as does a
grant of civil immunity, is to be strictly construed."' Nevertheless,
if the immunity clause is to fulfill its intended purpose of encouraging reliance on the collective judgment of the medical profession,
immunity probably should be conferred when there has been either
compliance with an applicable PSRO norm or express approval of
the course followed under the PSRO norms. Until a definitive judicial or administrative clarification is provided, however, the safest
way to attempt2 8 to avail oneself of the statutory grant of immunity
2 9
probably would be to secure, through appropriate procedures,
express "before the fact" PSRO approval of conduct complying with
the applicable norms. Moreover, such approval also may reduce the
likelihood that a claim of immunity could be challenged by the
assertion that the PSRO norm relied upon was not applicable to the
facts of the instant case.
The immunify provision is qualified by a proviso making it
available to a defendant "only if [inter alia] . . .he exercised due
care in all professional conduct . . . reasonably related to, and resulting from, the actions taken in compliance with or reliance upon
2 ' A
such professionally accepted norms of care and treatment.""
number of plausible interpretations of the qualifying language are
conceivable. The "due care" requirement may qualify the threshhold decision to rely on a PSRO norm as well as action taken incidental thereto.7 1 The fact that one relied upon an applicable PSRO
norm may thus create something approximating a presumption 2
that the defendant satisfied the relevant standard of care. Under
such a view the decision to rely upon the applicable PSRO norm
266.

See Note, GEo. WASH. L. REV., supra note 222, at 838.

267. See 3 J.

SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

§ 61.01 (4th ed. C.

Sands 1973), where it has been stated that "[ilf a change is to be made in the common law
...
the legislative purpose to do so must be clearly expressed." Id. at 41.
268. One recent decision has expressly refused to decide, at this juncture, the threshhold question of the authority of Congress to grant legal immunity under the PSRO legislation
against common law tort liability. See Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 125, 139 (N.D. Ill. 1975). Regrettably, the court was not moved to decision
by the argument that physicians and other providers might be exposed to civil liability for
complying with the law if the immunity clause is ultimately invalidated and if the PSRO
norms depart from otherwise applicable standards of care. See id.
269. The legislative history suggests that immunity may be lost when the standards or
norms are followed in an inappropriate manner or even when there has been express approval
by the PSRO if it was induced through the provision of erroneous or incomplete information.
See S. REP., supra note 226, at 267.
270. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-16(c) (Supp. II, 1972).
271. See Note, GEO. WASH. L. REv., supra note 222, at 838-39.
272. See id.
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might still be challenged as negligence, and the immunity clause
would thus be largely nullified.
A second and perhaps more credible theory is that the due care
requirement does not apply to the decision to rely upon applicable
PSRO standards. It would, however, be relevant to acts "reasonably
3
related to and resulting from" the application of the PSRO norms.
This construction is probably the more reasonable one if the immunity clause is to have independent significance. It accords the
PSRO norms conclusive weight. This interpretation, however, has
drawbacks, not the least of which is its potential rigidity in encouraging unquestioning deference to prescribed norms whose authors
may not have anticipated the specific situation presented. Perhaps
in idiosyncratic cases or circumstances in which the inappropriateness of the PSRO norms is otherwise clear, the inflexible effect
of the immunity clause could be mitigated simply by construing the
norms as inapplicable to the question at hand.
A question also emerges over whether a failure to comply with
applicable PSRO norms not only will deny to defendant the benefit
of the immunity provision, but also may signify or imply malpractice. Legislative history suggests that noncompliance with the
norms should create no presumption of malpractice. 274 If there is to
be no such presumption, would proof of noncompliance nevertheless
be evidence of negligence? In other words, if noncompliance gave
rise to no presumption, nor were deemed negligence per se generally,
would the PSRO norms nevertheless be probative evidence of the
standard of care for the purposes of evaluating a defendant's conduct? Presumably the legislature could have expressly provided for
the imposition of civil liability as a means of insuring compliance
with the norms had it chosen to do so. Thus, one could argue that
as a matter of strict statutory construction-inclusio unius est exclusio alterius-noncompliance should not, without more, be evidence of negligence. The absence of an express provision for civil
remedy alone, however, probably would not prevent the according
of some weight to a violation. More significantly, however, it remains to be seen whether the PSRO norms will be sufficiently specific to be said to represent fairly a standard of care in the traditional sense. 275 A fundamental question also arises concerning
whether the statutory requirements of compliance with the norms
are too conditional or qualified to mandate the imposition of tort
273.
274.
275.

See id. at 839.
See S. REP., supra note 226, at 267.
See Note, GEo. L.J., supra note 222, at 1506.
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liability for their breach.26 It is one thing to create a second standard of care, compliance with which is rewarded by relieving medical personnel from liability. It is a far different matter to key liability on noncompliance with that additional standard as well as the
preexisting common law standards. To do so, it seems, would
acutely aggravate problems that inhere in a situation involving coexisting standards of care within a single area. Until such time as
the relevant state standards of care and PSRO norms coalesce into
unified criteria governing medical performance, a construction limiting the legal effects of compliance or noncompliance with the
PSRO norms to those expressly stated in the statute appears the
wiser course. Until the question as to the full effect of noncompliance has been finally settled by the courts, however, those choosing
to disregard the applicable norms may be doing so at their peril.
A sanguine outlook27 would anticipate a gradual move of both
the common law rules and the PSRO norms toward an ultimate
congress in the form of a national professionally developed standard
of care for medical malpractice. The PSRO legislation might provide the impetus for developments in that direction. A less optimistic view might predict that an already confused, undivinable area
of the law will become hopelessly overburdened with a suffocating
and pervasive bureaucracy to administer a second legal system for
evaluating health care and adjusting grievances among patients and
health care professionals.
IV.

CONCLUSION

American lawmakers and jurists are or soon will be confronted
with a number of vital decisions affecting the professional liability
of members of the healing arts. At issue is the continuing validity
of the present system of fault based liability for medical malprac276. One court has vaguely intimated that the statute should not create the occasion
for the imposition of civil liability:
The "Profession Standards Review" Law does not prohibit a physician from performing any surgical operations he deems necessary in the exercise of his professional
skill and judgment. It merely provides that if a practitioner wishes to be compensated
for his services by the federal government, he is required to comply with certain guidelines and procedures enumerated in the statute.
- The risk of civil liability arises from common law standards of negligence, not from
the statute.
Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 125, 134, 139 (N.D.
Ill. 1975).
277. It is to be hoped that chapters in the PSRO Program Manual to be issued as well
as general HEW rules will help to clarify some of the questions ventilated in the foregoing
discussion. Until the administrative regulations and guidelines, and a credible case law have
evolved, however, the within statutory divination must be treated as provisional at best.
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tice, as well as the essential nature such a system should assume if
it survives. Though often divorced, the two issues are inextricably
wedded. The survival of the fault based system will assuredly depend in large measure on whether it can be made to work more
efficiently and more consistently while meeting its espoused goal of
loss redistribution based both upon the existence of a medical accident and upon an unacceptable quality of performance.
The wholesale adoption of a no-fault scheme for medical accidents raises serious questions concerning its overall costs, definitional feasibility, egalitarian and distributive justice features, and
basic fairness. These factors taken compositely militate strongly
against a no-fault solution at this juncture. A social security type
plan for financing health care needs poses fewer problems and would
foster a more faithful administration of the fault system for those
remaining economic losses by affording those stricken with misfortune a sure source of medical care outside of the fault based liability system. This would relieve some of the impetus behind suspect
determinations of fault predominantly motivated by a desire to succor downtrodden plaintiffs.
An essential step in any revitalization of the fault system for
medical malpractice lies in a reappraisal of the standard of care. It
is probably no exaggeration to say that the basic integrity of fault
based medical malpractice law and of the medical profession itself
depends upon the retention of a professionally developed standard
of care. This standard ideally should be based upon accepted practice, emphasizing the reasonable expectations of the profession.

